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The Promotion of Fundamental Rights by the Union as a 
contribution to the European legal space: the Role of European 
Private International Law 
 
This article aims to contribute both to the “REFGOV” project, which is focused on the 
ambition to find ways of promoting human rights within the European Union, but also, 
more in general and apart from the project, to an improved understanding of the crucial 
place conflict of law rules occupy in the building of a common Europe – a highly political 
question behind apparently technical issues. In the study the author deals with the 
parameters, points of interest etc. in relation to Private International Law which should 
be heeded if European Member States “look at” each other’s laws, and – in the context 
of the “REFGOV”project – if the idea would be to exchange “best practices” or 
harmonize substantive law, or to further harmonize Private International Law etc. 
through a kind of Open Method of Coordination. The contribution also shows that 
Private International Law issues are decisive in respect of every evaluation of the impact 
of European integration on human rights, both if this integration process takes place 
through “negative” harmonization (for example, by falling back on the principle of 
mutual recognition) and through “positive” harmonization. The main question is the 
following: what role is there to play for Private International Law in the promotion, by 
and within the European Union, of Human Rights? 
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INTRODUCTION 
I. The position of PIL in the project: an exotic wallflower or a well-integrated 
participant? 
For a long time, the discipline of private international law (‘PIL’) appealed to a limited 
number of lawyers only. Essentially, this may also be the case in 2006, even though the 
tide has been turning for some years now.  
 
In recent years, this field has been given a new impetus mainly by Europe and PIL is now 
in full swing. On closer inspection, it turns out that the tide is turning in two ways: on the 
one hand, PIL itself is undergoing an internal metamorphosis, both formally and 
substantively, but on the other hand, the relationship between PIL and other fields is 
changing fundamentally as well. Due to this repositioning of PIL, it is conceivable that 
PIL issues will appeal to an increasing number of lawyers. In a recent contribution1, I 
described recent developments in PIL, specifically European PIL, even as a 
‘metamorphosis from an exotic wallflower into a well-integrated participant in a variety 
of companies.’ For example, PIL has seen an increasing focus on European integration 
considerations. 
 
II. Point of departure of the analysis: the importance of PIL for a project which is focused 
on the ambition to find ways of promoting human rights within the Union 
The Open Method of Coordination (‘OMC’) can be briefly defined as follows2: ‘The 
open method of coordination is one of a number of new governance mechanisms which, 
from a theoretical point of view, are understood as performing a range of functions. 
These include fostering mutual learning between the Member States and avoiding or 
limiting the phenomenon of competitive deregulation in the internal market, while at the 
same time respecting the diversity of national practices and the existing division of 
powers between the European Community and the Member States.’   
 
Since PIL now keeps company with specialists in the fields of human rights, non-
discrimination law, comparative law, European law and the like, who work together in 
the project concerning the Open Method of Coordination in the field of human rights, 
constituted within the ‘Reflexive Governance Research Project’ (‘the project’), the 
question arises what the position of PIL in this kind of company should be. Can PIL be 
ignored in this kind of company and in this kind of project, or should the discipline be 
integrated into the debates and questions, and could it even play a prominent role in this 
kind of company? This contribution seeks to answer this very question. The main 
question is the following: what role is there to play for PIL in the promotion by and 
within the European Union of human rights? 
 
                                                 
1 V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Tien jaar Europees internationaal privaatrecht. Een verrassende metamorfose 
van exotisch muurbloempje tot goed geïntegreerde deelnemer in diverse gezelschappen’ [‘Ten Years of 
European Private International Law. A Surprising Metamorphosis from an Exotic Wallflower into a Well-
Integrated Participant in a Variety of Companies’], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 2005, pp. 
289-303. 
2 See, for example, O. De Schutter and S. Deakin ‘Introduction: reflexive governance and the dilemmas of 
social regulation’, in O. De Schutter and S. Deakin (eds.), Social Rights and Market Forces. Is the Open 
coordination of employment and social policies the future of social Europe? Bruxelles, Bruylant 2005, p.1. 
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III. The limitations and scope of the Paper 
It should be emphasized that this search for an answer will be of only an explorative 
nature for the time being. This is merely an explorative study3. Another limitation of this 
Paper lies in the selective nature of the analysis. Aspects that could be quite interesting as 
such – for example, in relation to ownerships rights, the law of evidence, criminal-law 
aspects etc. – will not be explicitly included in the analysis for the time being.   
 
Nevertheless, the scope of this contribution may be wider than its title suggests in some 
areas: for example, the following issues will be addressed: classical PIL questions  
(questions relating to jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement), and the 
doctrine of the ‘internationally mandatory rules’ (also known as the ‘règles d’application 
immédiate’); both family-law and non-family-law aspects of PIL; both pure PIL issues 
and PIL issues connected with developments outside the strict PIL domain – such as 
developments relating to unification and harmonisation of substantive law; migration law 
developments…; PIL issues related to aspects of “positive” and “negative” integration;  
likewise, the Paper is not confined to issues explicitly involving ‘human rights’ – rights 
currently regarded as such, for example the right of privacy, the freedom of expression 
etc. – but it also deals with discussions that encompass concerns like the ‘protection of 
the weak party’ – for example, concerns in relation to employee protection in 
international labour law. 
 
Thus, all in all, the article aims to contribute both to the “REFGOV”project, which is 
focused on the ambition to find ways of promoting human rights within the European 
Union, but also, more in general and apart from the project, to an improved 
understanding of the crucial place conflict of law rules occupy in the building of a 
common Europe – a highly political question behind apparently technical issues. In this 
study I deal with the parameters, points of interest etc., in relation to PIL which should be 
heeded if European Member States “look at” each other‘s laws, and – in the context of 
the “REFGOV”project – if the idea would be to exchange “best practices” or harmonize 
substantive law, or to further harmonize PIL etc. through a kind of Open Method of 
Coordination. The contribution also shows that PIL issues are decisive in respect of every 
evaluation of the impact of European integration on human rights, both if this integration 
process takes place through “negative” harmonization (for example, by falling back on 
the principle of mutual recognition) and through “positive” harmonization. 
 
PART I. COMPLEMENTARITY OF PIL AND EU LAW: THREE 
FUNCTIONS OF PIL IN REFGOV  
Let me begin by emphasizing, in quite general terms, that the importance of PIL for the 
project should not be overestimated, in my opinion. But even if PIL lawyers should be 
modest about their input in this context, I believe that PIL may certainly be crucially 
important in some respects and in a variety of manners. For example, PIL could 
sometimes act as a catalyst in promoting human rights, as an injection mechanism and 
incentive for triggering a chain reaction, furthering the cause of human rights. In this 
                                                 
3 Incidentally, this contribution has drawn heavily on Dutch-language sources. Unfortunately for the non-
Dutch reader interested in this subject, a number of works that are highly relevant to this project (such as  
publications by Van Hoek and Houwerzijl) are written in Dutch.  
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way, PIL could be a driving force. And a focus on PIL may sometimes cause people to be 
more alert to potential dynamics that are by no means conducive to promoting human 
rights, and warn them against counterproductive effects of specific PIL rules as well as 
against the counterproductive effects of specific rules on PIL rules.  
 
Let me be more concrete now: anyone who tries to define the role of PIL in this project – 
as I have done in recent months – will soon tend to distinguish three functions, even if, on 
closer inspection, these functions are closely connected with each other.  
 
I. PIL as a target of the outcome of the project: three reasons  
First and foremost, PIL may be regarded as a rather evident target of the outcome of the 
project, in the sense that it is quite conceivable that in due course, during or at the end of 
the project, suggestions will be defined in relation to the issue of PIL regulations, PIL 
directives, the inclusion or clarification of PIL rules in certain areas, or in relation to the 
manner in which the Court of Justice had best exercise a check on national PIL 
legislation, or in relation to the approximation of PIL rules by the European Member 
States themselves.4  
 
In other words, one of the project ‘outcomes’ will probably be that PIL is to be 
designated as one of the ‘target’ disciplines: OMC will sooner or later appeal to PIL. If 
this point is recognised, it is valid to argue that it would be fertile and efficient to 
anticipate this outcome by focussing attention on PIL issues right from the beginning. I 
will explain this in further detail below.  
 
Let’s take as a point of departure the functions of OMC. When we try to relate PIL to the 
project in this respect, a quotation taken from De Schutter may serve as a point of 
departure, because the latter discusses the functions of the OMC and argues in this 
context5 that one of its functions could be the following: ‘In fields where the 
                                                 
4 Incidentally, it is also conceivable that, taking account of all positive and negative effects of unification or 
harmonisation of PIL rules, the suggestion will be made that PIL rules in their present state should be left 
intact, allowing the Member States to continue to be able to draft and use their own PIL rules as they see 
fit: this suggestion could be made, for example, as a ‘second-best’ solution if it turns out that it is not 
possible to harmonise PIL at the highest possible and desirable level. This is because it cannot be right to 
trigger or support a downward trend or a ‘race to the bottom’. It is also conceivable that specific PIL rules 
and aspects will be unified but that the regulation of other PIL aspects will be left to the Member States (for 
example, unification of recognition rules and no unification of the rules concerning applicable law; or 
unification of internationally mandatory rules, but no unification or other PIL aspects) – perhaps in the 
hope that by using a kind of ‘OMC model’, the Member States will at the end of the day be inclined to take 
over each other’s best practices. On this subject, see also infra, Part I, I.C.2.b.1. Cf. also O. De Schutter, 
‘Monitoring Human rights in the Union as a Learning Process’ (I refer here to the original draft of one of 
the contributions to the project of De Schutter) where he discusses a ‘generous/restrictive interpretation 
concerning the principle of subsidiarity’, if it is found that leaving it to the Member States  may involve the 
risk of reducing the level of human rights protection.  
5 O. De Schutter, ‘The implementation of the EU Charter of Human rights through the Open Method of 
Coordination’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 2004 07/04 (published on 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/papers04.htlm), p. 2. Compare also O. De Schutter, 
‘Monitoring Human rights in the Union as a Learning Process’, where he states that ‘The question is which 
forms of jurisdiction should be created between regulators from different jurisdictions, to the extent that 
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competences are shared between the Member States and the Union, the Open Method of 
Coordination may be seen as a searching mechanism ‘to identify where an initiative of 
the Union may be required because of the externalities [italics vvde], both positive and 
negative, which the action of each Member State produces on all the other States, with 
which they share a common area of freedom, security and justice, and area in which, in 
particular, the free movement of persons and the free provision of services are guaran
and in which competition is to be free and undistorted’. Accordingly, if we keep this 
observation by De Schutter in the back of our minds, in particular where he refers to 
‘externalities’, it is quite evident that the project will sooner or later rely on PIL a
teed 
nd 
ppeal to PIL.  
ightforward that PIL should be one of the ‘targets’, and 
ere are three reasons for that.  
a
 
As a matter of fact, it is quite stra
th
 
I.A. Both OMC and PIL deal with “externalities”  
First, PIL has traditionally been the very discipline ‘dealing with externalities in issues of 
private law’. The existence of ‘externalities’ is indeed one of the prerequisites to PIL. PIL 
seeks to regulate the externalities by issuing rules concerning jurisdiction, applicab
recognition and enforcement. And in regulating ‘externalities’ in this way, PIL is 
inevitably confronted with human rights – and, in a broader sense, with concerns re
to the protection of weak parties etc. In short, PIL provides a way of dealing with 
externalities, including the confrontation with human rights issues. In this context, it 
should be underlined, however, that PIL is essentially national law
le law, 
lating 
 
hey do 
s to 
e 
                                                                                                                                                
6. Admittedly, there 
are areas where supranational sources are available, and these are sometimes even 
European sources. But some other areas are still regulated purely at the national level. It 
is also conceivable that even though supranational PIL rules are available, the latter are 
not applicable in all EU Member States. ‘Problems’ could arise either because of the 
contents of the PIL rules or because PIL rules are sometimes national-level rules, as 
stated above, which is emphasized to an increasing extent at this juncture: this is said to 
be the case mainly where PIL rules themselves do not satisfy the requirements 
occasioned by internal market considerations, or where people within the European Area
are confronted with problems because countries use different PIL rules, because t
not apply the same legal rules, or because they use different standards when it come
recognising decisions taken elsewhere, such that people lose rights or are confronted with 
legal uncertainty if they move to another country; harmonisation could well improve th
 
each jurisdiction is not an ‘island’ and that certain interdependencies exist between jurisdictions which 
cannot be ignored.’ 
6 As indicated above, PIL answers questions of  ‘international jurisdiction’, ‘applicable law’ and 
‘recognition and enforcement’. PIL is, however, in its essence national law written for international 
situations: the circumstance that situations have a relevant connection with more than one legal system adds 
an international dimension to the legal process, which may be found at three levels: (Dutch, French, 
German etc.) PIL rules include (1) rules of jurisdiction (in order to prescribe the conditions under which the 
Dutch/French/German etc. court is competent to entertain such a claim) (2) applicable law (in order to 
determine for each class of case the particular system of law (Dutch law/French law/German law/another 
law) by reference to which the rights of the parties must be ascertained) and (3) recognition and 
enforcement (in order to specify the circumstances in which a foreign judgment can be recognized and 
enforced).  Sources of PIL can be found at both an international and a national level. 
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extent to which rules are predictable and strengthen mutual trust. For this reason, the 
project may, sooner or later, address the contents of PIL rules and differences between 
PIL rules of various countries, which pose ‘problems’ for citizens. In that event, the 
project may address the extent to which it is desirable in a EU context to harmonise the 
arious ways in which the ‘externalities’ are regulated in a well-defined manner.   v
 
I.B. PIL has already been communautarised in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
At the same time, the foregoing brings us to the second reason why it is to be expected 
that PIL issues could become a project target. As a result of the entry into force of th
Treaty of Amsterdam, PIL, or at least parts of it, has been ‘communitarised’. PIL is 
linked directly with the idea and the project of the creation of an internal mark
area of freedom, security and justice, the fundamental freedoms and the non-
discrimination principle, and under the terms of this movement, far-reaching powers
been conferred on the European institutions. This means that European institutions 
already have the powers to take action in the field of PIL as the occasion arises, including 
the power to issue PIL regulations. Is it possible to contend for this reason that, where De
Schutter
e  
et and an  
 have 
 
ted for PIL 
 
te PIL rules at the European level, and this 
ossibility has already been widely used.   
on of 
ternal 
ealising the instrumental function PIL may play in achieving an internal 
arket.   
ield 
ing 
 a 
 and if so, how 
precisely – PIL should change as a result of European incentives.9 
7 discusses the ‘legal basis’, the legal basis that has already been crea
intervention may perhaps come in useful? It should not be forgotten that the 
Europeanisation of PIL, which manifested itself in the Treaty of Amsterdam, has made
the minds ‘ready’ and prepared to coordina
p
 
In short, Europe is already interfering with PIL through the process of Europeanisati
PIL, albeit not specifically from the perspective of human rights promotion within  
Europe, but from the perspective of the promotion of the internal market – as a result of 
the attempts to encourage legal certainty and to remove obstacles perceived in an in
market – r
m
 
This communitarisation phenomenon has triggered sensational developments in the f
of PIL, both in terms of procedure and in terms of substance: several European PIL 
regulations have already been issued and several regulations are in the process of draft
at this very juncture, certainly in areas where European institutions have traditionally 
exercised restraint, in particular the field of international family law; in addition, the 
Court of Justice has undauntedly started to intervene in national PIL issues in quite
drastic manner. PIL lawyers are engaged in a debate8 on whether –
                                                 
7 O. De Schutter, ‘Monitoring Human rights in the Union as a Learning Process’ and O. De Schutter, ‘The 
tters such as the cautio judicatum solvi (see e.g. Saldanha (C-122/96, Judgment 
es, 
implementation of the EU Charter’ (footnote 5), p. 17 ff, 29 ff, and 40 ff. 
8 It should be emphasized, however, that there were already discussions about the relationship between PIL 
and European law before the Treaty of Amsterdam, both from the perspective of the four freedoms and 
from the perspective of the non-discrimination principle, and that the Court of Justice, for example, had 
already intervened in ma
dated 2 October 1997). 
9 Including e.g. debates about the subsidiarity principle. Incidentally, a special point to be addressed 
concerns the question of how things are to be formalized: what is the  form (PIL regulations, PIL directiv
intervention by the Court of Justice, etc.) to be opted for and how should the utilisation of these various 
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I.C. PIL as an area of tensions 
I.C.1. The current situation: PIL is in an interplay of forces  
At this juncture, PIL is in an area of tension: on the one hand, PIL had already been the 
subject of  instrumentalisation tendencies in the past few years, but on the other hand, 
PIL  is now increasingly focussed on instrumentalisation attempts for European purposes, 
and all this has resulted in a battle of sometimes contradictory forces. I will explain these 
forces briefly.   
 
The point of departure in respect of the first force is that PIL had already been 
‘instrumentalised’ in previous years in various ways. Accordingly, the impact of political  
policy considerations on PIL has manifested itself in recent years such that in various 
domains there is by no means ‘neutral’ PIL, still based on the equality of legal systems,  
but that, on the contrary, PIL rules have been issued in a manner that is conducive to 
well-defined policy targets. Examples include concerns for the ‘protection of the weak 
party’ – see, for example, the rules concerning the applicable law relating to consumer 
contracts, employment contracts etc., or concerns about ‘supporting’ a  substantive law 
result, such as supporting the result of the possibility of marriage (known as ‘favor 
matrimonii’ in PIL) or supporting the possibility of divorce (known as favor divortii’ in  
PIL) or supporting the possibility of acquiring maintenance payments. In this context,  
reference may be made, for example, to developments in international tort law, where 
there has been an evolution from a focus on the tortfeasor and the place where the 
wrongful act was committed to more attention for the victim and the place where damage 
was sustained, certainly partly as a result of political developments, and where there have 
been pleas for using PIL to make a fitting contribution in the battle against international 
environmental pollution.10 As a matter of fact, the phrase ‘making a contribution’ was 
quite recently used in Dutch PIL in the context of the tendency to use PIL for the purpose 
                                                                                                                                                 
e 
h 
, 
on in the regulation, so that the 
ieelrechtelijke 
of 
a, 
g onrechtmatige daad in het international privaatrechtelijke conflictenrecht, 
relevant sources be coordinated in the most effective manner? For a recent publication on this issue, see 
also T. M. de Boer, ‘Olke bolke knol’, NJB 2005, issue 18, who is critical about the relationship between 
the Proposal for a Directive on Services, the Rome Convention on Applicable Law on Contracts and th
Hague Convention on Applicable Law on Agency, and where he states that the rules may not actually 
‘collide’ with each other, but that there definitely seems to be a problem in the field of accessibility. It 
seems that in the past, before the Treaty of Amsterdam, the ‘problem’ faced by  PIL lawyers was mainly 
one of searching for the hidden IPR rules in Directives and ascertaining how these could be combined wit
other national or supranational rules. They were also confronted with the problems of directives that had 
not been implemented in a timely fashion or at all – in this context reference could be made, for example
to the problems that arose in connection with the application of  Article 5 of the Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations. As matters stand, both PIL regulations and directives that include 
IPR rules that are to be implemented at the national level are issued. These may sometimes be inconsistent 
with the general European PIL legislation, which may provide for a reservati
rules do not actually collide, but which may cause accessibility problems.    
10 See, for example, for the Netherlands: B.M.M. Weiffenbach, ‘Justitia en Mercurius. Mater
tendensen  in het internationaal-privaatrechtelijke conflictenrecht bij grensoverschrijdende 
milieuvervuiling’ [Lady Justice and Mercury: Substantive Law Tendencies in International Conflict 
Laws in the Case of Cross-Border Environmental Pollution] , TMA 1989, pp.1-11; S.J. Schaafsm
Vervuiling in het conflictenrecht: een onderzoek naar theoretische concepten in praktijk van de 
internationale milieuvervuilin
Post Scriptum Reeks 1994.  
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of terrorist combating.11 Where the literature uses the phrase ‘PIL pollution’12 in analyses
of PIL rules concerning environmental pollution liability, the question arises whether w
are really facing PIL pollution in this context. I refer to other tendencies I described as 
‘PIL pollution’, especially in relation to Dutch PIL, in various publications in the past, 
namely using PIL for the purposes of restrictive migration policies and, in a more genera
sense, for the purpose of restricting public-law rights (rights based on aliens law, s
 
e 
l 
ocial 
curity law and nationality law) of third-country nationals in the Netherlands.13  
 
ast, model PIL from the perspective of other fields or 
olitical objectives in these fields.   
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Apparently, the ‘importance’ of PIL is on the increase, but it seems that people 
sometimes recognise this importance as a result of their conviction that PIL may be 
conducive to achieving political targets that are basically associated with other fields. 
Attempts are then made to ‘model’ PIL on this basis. In others words, even though the
importance of PIL is now recognised, this could, paradoxically, trigger tendencies to 
absorb, incorporate or, at the very le
p
 
No matter how one appreciates – in a positive or negative sense – any specific manner
instrumentalisation within or of PIL, instrumentalisation attempts or tendencies have 
occasionally led to a kind of ‘acquis’. Sometimes these instrumentalisation tendencies are 
reflected in specific PIL rules issued at the European level, in which case, this concerns a
kind of ‘acquis communautaire’ – see, for example, the rules concerning jurisdicti
contracts of employment, as included in the Brussels Convention14, and the rules 
concerning  applicable law in contracts of employment, as included in the R
Convention.15 In these situations, there could be said to be a kind of acquis 
communautaire, albeit, with possible variations, at the national level.16 Sometimes, PIL 
rules incorporating any manifestation of instrumentalisation for political reasons
unified – or the supranational sources reflecting these policy considerations are 
                                                 
11 See P. Vlas, ‘Terrorisme en IPR’ [Terrorism and PIL], WPNR 2005, pp. 663-666. 
12 See the above work by Schaafsma (footnote 10). 
13 In these analyses, I have pointed out several times that the ‘instrumentalisation’ of PIL for the purpose of 
encouraging mobility of persons (which Europe is currently trying to achieve in the context of international 
family law) is much more in line with the essence of PIL and modern PIL, which is essentially, even if only 
in part, focussed on facilitating legal transactions and the target of international harmonization, certainly 
now that Europe takes ‘favor’ tendencies to heart. On this issue, see also infra, under Part II, I.B.2.a. See 
also, on PIL and migration, Prel. Doc. No 8 of March 2006, “Some reflections on the utility of applying 
certain techniques for international co-operation developed by the Hague Conference on private 
international law to issues of international migration” (Note submitted by the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, published on www.hcch.net under “Work in Progress”)  
14 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
27 September 1968, OJ C 189 28.07.1990 (consolidated version published in 1998 (OJ C 27, 26.01.1998)  
(‘the Brussels Convention’). 
15 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (“Rome Convention”), OJ C 27, 
26.01.1998, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980.   
16 On this subject, see also A.A.H. Van Hoek, Internationale mobiliteit van werknemers; een onderzoek 
naar de interactie tussen arbeidsrecht, EG-recht en IPR aan de hand van de Detacheringsrichtlijn 
{International Mobility of Employees; A Study into the Interaction between Labour Law, EC Law and PIL 
on the Basis of the  Poster Workers Directive], Den Haag, Sdu Uitgevers (Phd UVA), 2000, pp. 103-104 
and M.S. Houwerzijl, De Detacheringsrichtlijn, Deventer: Kluwer 2005, (Ph D on the Directive on Posting 
of Workers), p. 4. 
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applicable only in specific European Member States. Naturally, even if there is no 
unification, it is conceivable that each of the European Member States have inco
political policy considerations into their national PIL to the same or a different extent. 
For example, several countries have embraced the principle of ‘favor divortii’– 
supporting the possibility of divorce – but in different degrees and in a variety of ways. 
All this may well result in what I could describe as ‘modern P
rporated 
IL’, although it should be 
orne in mind that this ‘modern PIL’ may well vary from country to country, and it may 
 
  
tool in achieving European targets. This has 
sulted in  ‘pressure’ being exerted on ‘modern’ PIL  – of European or national origin –  
any  
f 
justed 
practices , and the debate on the Proposal Rome II itself. In the second part of this 
                                                
b
or may not have been given substance at the European level. 
 
It turns out – and this brings me to the second force I pinpointed above – that PIL has 
become increasingly focused on instrumentalisation tendencies inspired by ‘European
policy considerations’, in particular since the Treaty of Amsterdam – in other words, 
attempts are being made to use PIL as a 
re
as instrumentalised at an earlier stage.   
 
Occasionally, these ‘old’ and ‘new’ PIL incentives match each other well but at other 
times, they are in conflict: sometimes the Europeanisation of  PIL does not involve 
fundamental changes – see, for example, the conversion of the Convention on the 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (‘the 
Brussels Convention’) into a Council Regulation to the same effect (‘The Brussels 
Regulation’)17, which did not encroach essentially on the principle of the protection o
the weak party, which had been enshrined in the Convention; but sometimes there are 
fierce debates on the manner in which the existing  PIL regime can or cannot be ad
– examples include the debate on the implications of the country-of-origin principle in 
the Proposal for a Directive on Services18 for the Rome I proposal19 and the Rome II 
proposal20, the discussion about the impact of the country-of-origin principle in the E-
Commerce Directive21 and the original version of the Directive on unfair commercial 
22
 
17 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 012, 16.01.2001, p. 0001-0023. 
18 Proposal for a Directive on services in the internal market COM (2004) 2def/2 13 January 2004. 
Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal 
market Com (2006)160 final 4.4.2006. 
19 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (“Rome I”) 15.12.2005 COM (2005) 650 final. 
20 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (“Rome II”) 22.07.2003 COM (2003) 427 (01). Amended Proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”) 
21.02.2006 COM (2006) 83 final.  
21 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market 
(“Directive on electronic commerce”) OJ L 178, 17.07.2000 p. 0001-0016.  
22 COM (2003) 356 def (namely article 4 par. 1) and COM (2004) 753 def. Directive 2005/29/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7 
EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC), No 
2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (“Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”), OJ L 
149/22 11.6.2005.   
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Paper,   I will deal with these dynamics again: there, I will make a first attempt to 
position – in a fragmentary way – the convergence or tension between ‘old’ (classic’) and 
ew’ (European) tendencies to instrumentalise PIL and its interaction with human rights.       
uld we instrumentalize PIL for the promotion of human rights in the EU 
‘n
 
I.C.2. How co
framework?  
I.C.2.a. Ambition: instrumentalisation of PIL from the perspective of human rights 
promotion within the Union!? …  
So what is the relevance of these dynamics and debates for the project, one may well ask.
This may be apparent where we address the question of what position should be take
this debate by those who are concerned about the ‘promotion of human rights’. The 
following ambition could be defined: how should we evaluate or develop PIL 
various legal domains that are the most effective tools for the purposes of the 
instrumentalisation of PIL
 
n in 
rules in 
 from the perspective of promoting the protection of human 
ghts within the Union?  
 
, 
to be 
mentalisation 
e same time – or, at the very least, 
at does not impede the promotion of human rights? 
ri
 
In short, if it is true that there are tendencies to instrumentalise PIL for European  
purposes, if it is true that there are tendencies to instrumentalize for political purposes in
general, and if it is true that there are debates about how to develop PIL into the future
should we then not seize the opportunity to analyse at the same time how PIL is 
instrumentalised such that it is most conducive to the objective of human rights 
promotion in the EU framework? Or, to put it differently: if there is instru
of PIL anyway, would it not be a good idea to try and promote a type of 
instrumentalisation that also fosters human rights at th
th
 
I.C.2.b. … Taking into account the way certain initiatives outside PIL would affect PIL 
Because PIL regulates aspects of ‘externalities’, it is useful to examine the implications 
for PIL if using OMC yields a suggestion of some kind of coordination or action.23 This
will reveal – still within the context of the first role to be played by PIL in the project – 
the extent to which PIL debates could be taken into account in a more indirect manner 
well, in particular by focusing attention on the impact of any initiatives and proposals
outside PIL on PIL. This concerns the ambition to define and evaluate the manner in 
which ‘solutions’ and proposals invented outside the realm of PIL and put forward to 
foster European integration and, perhaps in part, to promote human rights could, for their 
part, have an impact on PIL rules, a
 
as 
 
nd to evaluate these dynamics. This ambition could be 
rioritized from this moment on.   p
 
I.C.2.b.1. Substantive law harmonization 
This could include interactions between developments relating to the harmonisation of  
substantive law on the one hand and PIL developments on the other – where PIL is t
taken as including ‘internationally mandatory rules’. First and foremost, it is worth 
mentioning that PIL is sometimes regarded as a way to bridge differences between  
o be 
                                                 
23 For a characterization of the various different forms of coordination  (meaning  different ways to  
progress European integration), see O. De Schutter, ‘Monitoring Human rights in the Union as a Learning 
Process’, discussing ‘the many forms of an improved coordination’. 
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various legal systems without unifying the latter, in which context PIL is claimed to be a
substitute for the harmonisation of substantive law; in addition, it is often claimed that  
PIL assumes and follows naturally from the unification of substantive law, because it is 
considered necessary to achieve a specified minimum level of substantive law consensus 
before starting to apply – flexible – PIL rules. Does mutual recognition in this sense also 
assume a specified degree of harmonisation of substantive law, or does the very concept 
of mutual recognition allow quite essential differences to continue to exist? In short, the
relationship between PIL and substantive law seems to be quite dialectic in nature and  
may perhaps necessitate a broader a
 
 
nalysis. Below, I will pinpoint a number of specific 
sues that merit further attention.  is
 
* Implications for issues of ‘internationally mandatory rules’  
A first point that merits attention in studying the interaction between harmonisatio
substantive law and PIL could be the following: what would be the effects of the 
harmonisation of substantive law on specific PIL domains? This should cover not only 
the obvious changes in rules in the areas of recognition and enforcement and applicable 
law but also the implications in respect of ‘internationally mandatory rules’ – rules that 
are deemed to be applicable in specific international legal relationships, irrespecti
the applicable law that customarily governs this legal relationship. This focus on 
internationally mandatory rules may raise questions in respect of the following: would 
harmonisation of substantive law in some way or other (for example, in relation to the 
type of harmonisation: minimum or complete harmonisation; in relation to the rational
of harmonisation: harmonisation intended to remove internal market obstacles and/or 
intended to create a minimum protection level for specific persons) have an impact on
possibility or the obligation of using well-defined rules as internationally mandat
rules, and, if this is the case, would this be regrettable? In this context, I refer to 
international labour law studies
n of  
ve of 
the 
e 
 the 
ory 
tus of 
 
 
l 
                                                
24 and to some observations made in a recent Belgian 
study on non-discrimination law, in particular relating to the impact of the Directive on 
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin25 on the sta
national anti-discrimination legislation in an international context26, in particular 
concerning the  possibility of invoking such legislation as internationally mandatory rules
within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations: according to Traest, it is possible to argue that once the Directive on equa
 
24 See in particular A.A.H. van Hoek, ‘De bilateralisering van de voorrangsregelleer in Europa’ [‘The 
Bilateralisation of the Doctrine of Internationally Mandatory Rules in Europe’] in R. Kotting, J.A. Pontier 
and L. Strikwerda (ed.), Voorkeur voor de lex fori. Symposium ter gelegenheid van het afscheid van Prof. 
Mr. Th. M. de Boer [Preference for the Lex Fori. Symposium on the occasion of the Departure of Prof. 
T.M. de Boer], Deventer: Kluwer 2004, pp. 5-36, and J. Fetch, Eingriffsnormen und EG-Vertrag: die 
Pflicht zur Anwendung der Eingriffsnormen anderen EG-Staaten – as reviewed by A. van Hoek, Common 
Market Law Review 2005, pp. 1538-1541.  
25 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. On this directive, see also O. De Schutter, ‘The 
implementation of the EU Charter’ (footnote 5), p. 18.  
26 See, for example, M. Traest, ‘Enkele overwegingen over de toepasselijkheid van de wet ter bestrijding 
van discriminatie in internationale (arbeids)verhoudingen’ [‘Some considerations about the Applicability 
of the Anti-Discrimination Act in International Labour Relationships’]  in D. Cuypers (ed.), Gelijkheid in 
het arbeidsrecht. Gelijkheid zonder grenzen? [Equality in Labour Law. Equality without  Limits?] 2003, 
pp. 67-95, p. 80. 
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treatment has come into force in the Member States, national anti-discrimination la
cannot be used anymore as internationally mandatory rules – yet, in his view, anti-
discrimination law could still function as a ‘loi d’ordre police’. Would it be useful, on
wonders, to evaluate from this perspective in what cases it is appropriate to have the 
possibility of invoking well-defined rules as internationally mandatory rules – and co
this evaluation allow us to argue in favour of the unification of substantive law or a 
specific area thereof? If the conclusion is drawn, for example, that only minimum-level 
harmonisation is feasible, and that this would entail the creation of unwanted restrictions
when it comes to the possibility of invoking specific rules as internationally mandatory 
w 
e 
uld 
 
les, would this lead to the decision that it is better not to opt for harmonisation?27            
 in the Ingmar Case: the scope of harmonised law and its effects on 
ru
 
* Problems raised
party autonomy  
A second issue that merits attention could be the manner in which the international scope
of legislation that includes unified or harmonised substantive law is to be defined. This
question has become particularly pregnant in PIL in the light of the Court of Justic
Ingmar decision.
 
  
e’s 
 of a 
. 
ld 
s 
n 
spect. 
                                                
28 In this case, the Court of Justice faced the legal position of an 
internationally operating agent. The parties had agreed on the application of the law
non-European legal system – namely the law of the USA – but the question arose 
whether European unified rules that provide for specific rights for commercial agents 
after the termination of their agency agreement could be set aside by this choice of law
These unified rules had been codified in the European Directive on Agency, which  is 
partly29 intended to protect the agent, as a ‘weak party’.  In this case, where the agent 
performed his activities in the United Kingdom, the principal was established in a non-
Member State (namely the United States), and where a clause in the contract stipulated 
that the contract was governed by the law of that third country, the Court of Justice he
that Articles 17 and 18 of the Directive had to be applied even though the parties had 
chosen US law as the applicable law, and the Court was of the opinion that these rule
could be regarded more or less as internationally mandatory rules.30 But this Ingmar 
decision is still quite controversial – for example, in terms of its implications for the 
assessment of the legal position of internationally operating employees – and, in a more 
general sense, in terms of the question of how the international scope of unified Europea
substantive law is to be defined if the legislation itself is not transparent in this re
This problem shows how well it is possible to argue that it is necessary to unify 
 
27 See also supra Part I, I. And see also, on the issue of harmonisation, below, footnote 52, on the 
Communications and the Action Plan on European Contract law. And see also the project “European 
Labour Law Network (see www.elln.eu), an EU-wide network of labour law academics. The main activity 
of the ELLN will be the development of general rules and principles of European labour law – on the basis 
of law studies in the different EU-Member States – by using a Restatement approach.  
28 ECJ Ingmar C-381/98, 9 November 2000. 
29 See also, on the aim of stimulating a fair competition within the internal market, and the implications of 
focusing on either this aim (considered by de Boer as the aim of protecting a “public interest”) , or the aim 
of protecting the agent (considered by de Boer as the aim of protecting an “individual interest”), Th. M. De 
Boer, comments with Ingmar, NJ 2005, 332.      
30 Compare, in this context,  the remarks made by O. De Schutter, ‘Monitoring Human rights in the Union 
as a Learning Process’, concerning the ‘harmonisation or approximation of laws’ and ‘uniform (federal) 
law’ as ‘ways to manage the protection of human rights under a constitutional framework which guarantees 
essential freedoms of movement.’  
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substantive law for the purpose of removing internal market obstacles and/or for the 
purpose of protecting the weak party, but that the question of the international scope of 
this legislation, and the impact on the parties’ choice of law options31 etc., may st
This raises the question under what circumstances it is desirable that the parties’ 
possibility of making a choice of law, as in the Ingmar case, should be ‘affected’. This 
means that it is necessary to evaluate whether a specific type of unification of su
law should be accompanied by the definition of the international scope of these 
substantive law provisions and, conversely, of the extent to which, even if the unificatio
of PIL rules is achieved, in particular where agreement is reached on the choice of 
options, such choice of law may be overridden by the applicability of harmonised 
substantive law. Because even in the case of the unification of applicable law, even in the 
case of  the unification of the choice of law option, it turns out t
ill arise. 
bstantive 
n 
law 
hat problems may arise in 
onnection with the relationship with unified substantive law.  
roduction and proliferation of the country-of-origin principle – mutual 
c
 
I.C.2.b.2. Int
recognition 
When it comes to initiatives outside the field of PIL having an effect on PIL, anothe
issue is undoubtedly the discussion about the implications of the country-of-origin 
principle on PIL. Naturally, I also refer to the debates on the original proposal of a  
Directive on Services
r 
 
  
 on 
n the manner in which traditionally weak parties are protected in international situations. 
32, debates on the introduction of this principle in the E-Commerce
Directive33, or in the Directive on Unfair Business Practices34 etc. As De Schutter and
Francq35 explain in a recent article, the introduction of this ‘home country principle’ 
could have serious effects on PIL, and, accordingly, on the protection of internationally 
mobile employees. Applicable law rules would come under pressure, and the Directive
Posting of Workers36 could perhaps be transformed from a model based on minimum 
protection for cross-border posting of employees towards a model based on maximum 
protection. In a more general sense, ‘regulatory competition’ would be stimulated in this 
way.37 In PIL, fierce debates are currently being conducted about the significance of the  
country-of-origin principle; which also turn out to be relevant to the project, because the 
proliferation of this principle in private law may have far-reaching effects,  for example, 
o
 
I.C.3. The OMC could help on this 
                                                 
31 As permitted currently, for example, in Article 3 of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations. 
32 See footnote 18. 
33 See footnote 21. 
34 See footnote 22. 
35 O. De Schutter en S. Francq, ‘La proposition de directive relative aux services dans le marché intérieur: 
reconnaissance mutuelle, harmonisation et conflits de lois dans l’Europe élargie » Cahiers de droit 
européen 2005, issue 5-6, pp. 603-660. 
36 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
Posting of Workers in the framework of the provision of services OJ L 018 21/01/1997 p. 0001-0006.  
37 See also infra in footnote 97, including a quotation from De Schutter and Francq. The Directive on 
Posting of Workers resulted from concerns about the protection of workers’ rights in the framework of the 
provision of services and from concerns about unfair competition (fears about unfair competion from 
Member States with lower protection).  
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All in all, looking for ways to instrumentalise PIL for the promotion of human rights in
the EU framework, and taking into account hereby the way certain initiatives outside PIL 
would affect PIL, the OMC could possibly help. Even if the project conclusion is that
using OMC as a method in the human rights domain is not realistic and fertile, the results 
of a study as meant above could be useful in the context of the discussion
 
 
 about PIL 
sues and their relationship with human rights. Conceivably, OMC could be relevant as a 
f ways.  
is
method of promoting human rights in this context in a variety o
 
I.C.3.a. The OMC could bring about the creation of PIL rules 
One hypothesis might be, for example, that OMC could help to create PIL rules (at the 
European level or Member State level – eventually controlled by the Court of Justice) 
a way that encourages the protection of human rights within Europe. Where De Schutter
wrote about the function of OMC to define areas of intervention, it is also possible to 
argue that where such areas have already been defined, OMC could be used to identify
in 
 
 
e manner in which action is to be taken – in particular, in areas like PIL. Hence, PIL 
 
 devote 
n 
 rules (supranational, European or national, and covering jurisdiction, 
pplicable law, recognition and enforcement) regulate ‘externalities’ at the present 
ting 
th
lawyers might assume the task of heeding the results of the use of the OMC method. 
 
Viewed from this perspective, PIL would be relevant only at the end of the project.  
 
But it might be better to address PIL issues before that: the task would then be to
systematic attention to PIL issues during the project already, including the manner i
which PIL
a
moment.  
 
I.C.3.b. Member States could, within the OMC, learn from each other’s PIL, stimula
mutual learning and mutual trust  
For example, this project might examine the manner in which the various European
Member States have dealt with PIL issues, look into what the Member States can
 
 learn 
om each other and how European institutions can learn from the experiences  of 
38  
fr
Member States if they intend to issue PIL rules: what are the ‘best practices’?
 
I.C.3.c. The OMC could be used as a tool to evaluate PIL issues at EU level 
Another possibility is to examine and evaluate the way in which PIL problems are
being solved and whether or not P
 now 
IL issues are being unified and the extent to which 
ese are conducive to ‘promoting human rights’, taking account of the factor of 
n 
it comes to the interface between international labour law and social security law, several 
th
‘feasibility’ at the highest level.  
 
All this could be carried out with respect to domains such as international family law, 
international labour law, international tort law etc., where human rights issues are 
relevant – or, in  a broader sense, wherever concerns such as the ‘protection of the  weak 
party’, ‘family life protection’ etc. are relevant. In this context, I refer to a few studies 
that are very interesting for the project, viewed from this perspective, in particular whe
                                                 
38 Cf. the Project “European Research Network in PIL”, www.european-research-network.org 
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publications by Van Hoek39 and Houwerzijl40; in the field of international family law
studies by Waaldijk
, 
 the field of anti-discrimination law as such, studies by Van 
 
 
d 
d of PIL and the subsequent mutual learning brought about was 
ctually carried out. 
 
get 
r the 
 this stage already. In my opinion, this question  
ould be answered in the affirmative.  
41; in
Hoek42 and Traest43.  
In fact, in I.C.3.b. and I.C.3.c., we are dealing with, in fact, two interrelated but different 
functions of the OMC to be played, namely: (1) the OMC as a way of stimulating mutual 
learning in the field of PIL – ex ante -, through the reciprocal exchange of knowledge and
experience amongst the different actors concerned (Member States, EU institutions etc.)
and (2) the OMC as a tool to evaluate – ex post – how that exchange of knowledge an
experience in the fiel
a
 
In sum, the following provisional conclusion can be drawn in respect of the first role that 
could be played by PIL in this project: in this context, it is the impact of human rights on
PIL and the impact of the project outcome in terms of its human rights promotion tar
on PIL, which for its part regulates ‘externalities’, that will perhaps be of particular 
importance. At this juncture, the crucial decision in this context would be whethe
likelihood that the project will sooner or later affect PIL constitutes a reason for 
anticipating PIL issues from now on, taking account of current debates, opposition, 
sensitivity etc. concerning PIL, and, in this way, to think about suggestions relating to 
what PIL rules could be ‘appropriate’ at
sh
 
II. PIL as a tool 
Above – under I.C.2.b.1. -, I mentioned that , on the one hand, PIL is sometime
as a way to bridge differences between various legal systems without unifying 
them.Thus, the question raises if PIL could be seen as a tool for
s regarded 
 the EU to bridge 
ifferences between legal systems without unifying the latter.  d
                                                 
39 See, for example, A.A.H. van Hoek, ‘Een schijnbaar simpel vraagje: zwangerschapsverlof in het IPR’ 
[‘A Seemingly Simple Question: Maternity Leave in PIL’], NIPR 2002, pp. 296-300.  
40 See, for example, M.S. Houwerzijl, De Detacheringsrichtlijn, Deventer: Kluwer 2005, especially pp. 
159-166 (Ph D on the Directive on Posting of Workers). 
41 C. Waaldijk et al., More or less together: levels of legal consequences of marriage, cohabitation and 
registered partnership for different-sex and same-sex partners. A comparative study of nine European 
countries, Paris: INED 2005 (a comparative study, including PIL aspects).   
42 A.A.H. van Hoek, ‘Nationaliteitsdiscriminatie en IPR – een commentaar op de uitspraak van de 
Commissie Gelijke Behandeling van 4 februari 1997’ [‘Nationality Discrimination and PIL – A 
Commentary on the Opinion of the Equal Treatment Commission’] , Sociaal recht 1997, pp. 353-358. 
A.A.H. van Hoek, Internationale mobiliteit van werknemers [International Mobility of Employees], pp. 
478-481, about the applicability of the Dutch Equal Treatment Act in a variety of disputes, for example,  
relating to a potentially prohibited distinction based on marital status and/or sexual orientation in offering 
travel facilities to employees and their partners by an airline (Opinion of the Equal Treatment Commission 
96-97 dated 4 September 1996, NIPR 1997, 234); relating to an international shipping case, where the 
Collective Agreement made a distinction with respect to the terms and conditions of employment between  
employees residing in Indonesia and/or the Philippines on the one hand, and all other employees on the 
other hand (Opinion 97-13 of 4 February 1997, NIPR 1997, 235), and relating to the question of whether an 
international organisation is permitted to set conditions in terms of the nationality of the employee to be  
recruited and selected (Opinion 98-81 of 8 July 1998).    
43 M. Traest, ‘Enkele overwegingen over de toepasselijkheid van de wet ter bestrijding van discriminatie in 
internationale (arbeids)verhoudingen’ (footnote 26).   
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I also mentioned that, on the other hand, it is also often claimed that application 
flexible PIL rules assumes unification of substantive law to a certain degree. Could we
now also argue the inverse, namely that PIL could bring about harmonisation of 
substantive law, and tha
of 
 
t thus PIL could be useful for the EU in bringing about 
armonization of substantive law if desirable and possible – especially seen from the 
 
e PIL as a “tool”. 
 
h
perspective of the promotion  of human rights? Hereafter, I will explore the possibilities
to us
 
II.A. Positive Effects of PIL: PIL as a catalyst for the promotion of human rights in the
EU  
Above, it was argued that OMC may possibly help to define better PIL rules or better 
ways of taking account of PIL rules – and that thinking about and working with OMC 
should be accompanied by a study of PIL issues. But, as one may suggest, cannot there 
be interaction in the opposite direction as well? Could PIL perhaps somehow support 
MC as well? Is it a good idea to connect the use of OMC with the promotion of specific 
man 
y a passage from an article by De Schutter, in which he writes 
bout the ‘conditions of success’ and ‘flanking measures’ of OMC. The hypothesis would 
 
hts in 
s a 
atalyst in the promotion and flourishing of OMC, ultimately resulting in the promotion 
                                                
O
kinds of PIL rules? Can PIL function as the driving force behind the promotion of hu
rights? 
 
This idea is inspired b
a
then be that the inclusion of specific PIL rules may be regarded as one of the conditions 
of success of OMC.  
 
So this is a second possibility where PIL could be relevant to the project – and, hence, a 
second possible role to be played by PIL in the project. This role may become clearer if 
one considers the impact of PIL itself on the promotion of human rights, which is 
connected with the idea that PIL may ultimately help to promote human rights. Earlier,
De Schutter44 referred to the ‘conditions of success’ and ‘flanking measures’ of OMC 
and  it is quite possible to conceive that PIL could be one of these conditions of success 
or ‘flanking measures’ of OMC, because it is quite certain that where specific conditions 
have been satisfied, PIL may well be regarded as a catalyst in promoting human rig
Europe; indeed, if certain conditions have been satisfied, PIL may even be regarded a
c
of human rights across Europe. Below I will briefly explain a number of  potential 
approaches in this context: how exactly could PIL promote human rights in Europe? 
 
Some of what will be addressed below could also be considered in the light of  De 
Schutter’s observations 45 about maximizing ‘the benefits of regulatory competition 
between the horizontal units, while limiting the risk of a race to the bottom in the field of 
human rights. (…) identify situations where the Union should exercise its powers to 
protect and promote human rights, while organizing the competition between the Union 
and the Member States through a renewed understanding of the principle of subsidiarity. 
 
44 O. De Schutter, ‘Monitoring Human rights in the Union as a learning Process’, discussing ‘the conditions 
of success of an open method of coordination in the field of human rights.’ 
45 O. De Schutter, ‘Monitoring Human rights in the Union as a Learning Process’. 
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At both levels, forms of co-ordination between the units concerned (the Memb
and the Union) should be invented’, et cetera. The question arises whether a form of PIL 
coordination could possibly be this form of coordination. For example, is the organisation 
of a flexible system of mutual recognition (where it is legitimate to represent 
‘recognition’ as a PIL principle) a form of coordination that can promote human rights
In this context, it is appropriate to immediately refer to the debates about the Directive
Services, which was criticised heavily because the principle of ‘mutual recognition’ 
enshrined in it would in all likelihood be anything but conducive to the protection of  
employees – and this criticism was also expressed by the PIL discipline, because PIL 
achievements (and proposals for the ‘Europeanisation’ of PIL, a
er States 
? 
 on 
bove all proposals for a  
ome I and a Rome II regulation) could be put aside. On the other hand, it is fitting to 
 to 
e 
 
anism for 
, if 
es 
 
ge 
 extent can PIL  
 driving force in promoting human rights, in the knowledge that 
sues such as ‘availability’ are often relevant in the context of human rights and PIL has 
a contribution to make when it comes to issues such as ‘availability’ and 
‘transferability’.49  
                                                
R
point out the potentially ‘uplifting’ movement  that could be the result of an obligation
recognise a same-sex marriage solemnised in a Member State.  
 
The passage below should also be viewed in the light of De Schutter’s observations46 
about ‘two elements (…) lacking in the current system. First, there exists no screening 
mechanism which would identify, on a systematic basis, where some form of 
coordination between the Member States – or even some form of legislative action at th
federal level – might be required, in order to ensure that, left to themselves, the dynamics 
of the internal market or of the area of freedom, security and justice, will not lead to a
lowering of the level of protection of human rights. Second, there is no mech
collective learning between the Member States, despite the usefulness of such a device
it is properly imagined.’ Elsewhere, De Schutter47 describes one of the functions  of 
OMC as follows: ‘(…) the open method of coordination could be seen as an 
encouragement to mutual learning, as the solution preferred in certain Member Stat
may inspire the adoption of similar solutions in other Member States, especially where 
such replication avoids the risk that the implementation of human rights at the level of 
each State recreate obstacles within the internal market or impede the cooperation 
between the Member States in the area of freedom, security and justice’ and De Schutter 
and Deakin48 define the following hypothesis: ‘Thus our hypothesis is that central among
the conditions of success of OMC and related processes are mechanisms which function 
as incentives for the actors to reflect upon the extent to which their understanding of the 
problem which is to be overcome and their own position may be context-dependent, and 
therefore may be open to revision in the light of experience (…)’ and, he goes on to say 
that ‘(…) certain institutional frameworks facilitate reflexivity, while others discoura
it’. To what extent can PIL be useful?, one wonders. To what extent can PIL be this kind 
of  ‘incentive’, to what extent can PIL  promote ‘reflection’ etc.? To what
act as a catalyst and
is
 
46 O. De Schutter, ‘Monitoring Human rights in the Union as a Learning Process’. 
47 O. De Schutter, ‘The implementation of the EU Charter’ (footnote 5), p. 3. 
48 O. De Schutter and S. Deakin, ‘Introduction: Reflexive Governance and the Dilemmas of Social 
Regulation’ (footnote 2), p. 3. 
49 On this subject, see also infra Part I, III.B. 
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II.A.1. PIL rules may create domino effects 
PIL could act as a driving force in promoting human rights, as suggested above. One 
possible approach in this context would be a focus on the domino effects that co
created by means of  PIL rules, for example when it comes to the effects of the 
imposition of an obligation on Member States to recognise concepts created elsewhere
this could be perceived as a kind of injection given to a legal system by means of PIL
rules, an incentive to develop in a well-defined direction. To substantiate this point, 
reference can be made to current developments in European international divorce law: as 
a result of the issue of flexible rules concerning the recognition of international divorces 
in the ‘Brussels II’ Regulation 
uld be 
: 
 
international divorce law and perhaps even substantive divorce law.  There is room for 
50,  as well as in the ‘Brussels II bis’ Regulation51, in 
which  the ‘favor divortii principle’ has been incorporated, it turns out that European  
incentives are offered in the direction of a more general tendency to liberalise 
52
                                                 
50 Council Regulation (EC) no. 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
dren of 
d the 
licy’], 
n 
 
’, 
, 
nised 
ch 
: 
that 
made, for 
 
. 
mily law to purely 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for chil
both spouses, OJ L 160, 30 June 2000, p. 19. 
51 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction an
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) no. 1347/2000, OJ 23 December 2003, pp. 1-29. 
52 See V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Internationaal privaatrecht en migratierecht. De evolutie van een 
tweesporenbeleid’ [‘Private International Law and Migration Law. The Evolution of a Two-Track Po
Nemesis 2002, pp. 75-88. See also (but in this publication, these dynamics are assessed in a rather negative 
way; at least there is an appeal for stopping these dynamics where they go too far), J. Meeusen, ‘The 
personal status of migrants at the interaction of human rights, private international law and European Unio
Law (to be published in the proceedings of the ‘Toogdag Mensenrechten’ on ‘Mobilising Human Rights –
Rethinking the Significance of Human Rights in an Era of Great Mobility’, organized in Leiden, October 
2005. See also J. Meeusen, ‘System Shopping in European Private International Law in Family Matters
presented at the Private expert seminar (JAI Conference) on, ‘What international family law is ‘necessary 
for the proper functioning of the internal market?  An inquiry into the desirability of European private 
international law in family matters, with special regard to its legality, scope and implications in practice’
organized in Antwerp, Belgium, 21-22 October 2005 (to be published in J. Meeusen, M. Pertegas, G. 
Straetmans, F. Swennen (eds.), International Family Law for the European Union, Antwerp: Intersentia 
2006, in press) and J. Meeusen, “Instrumentalisation of private international law of and by European 
migration law”, lecture at the expert seminar on “Instrumentalisation of and by migration law”, orga
by the Scientific Research Network of the Research Foundation-Flanders on “Transposition of and Legal 
Protection under European Migration Law”, Antwerp, 9 December 2005. On the phenomenon of 
‘backwards progression’, see also G. Steenhoff et al., Een zoektocht naar Europees familierecht [A Sear
for European Family Law]. Preliminary Report No. 58 Netherlands Comparative Law Association, Kluwer
Deventer 1999, 141 p.: this preliminary report argues in favour of the further unification of European 
family law, and it is clear that the writers have the unification of substantive law in mind. They claim that 
the unification of PIL does not go far enough. Remarkably, as far as the opposite direction is concerned, 
these writers do regard PIL as a field where it can be quite useful to use uniform European family law. For 
example, they consider using European family law as ‘surrogate law’, ‘subsidiary law’, and also law 
can be used by means of a choice of law in international cases (in this context, reference could be 
example, to contract law legislation, such as the Vienna Convention (United Nations Convention on 
Contracts For the International Sale of Goods, 1980 (CISG); cf. also the problems outlined in the 
Communication from  the Commission on European Contract law from 2001, the Action Plan from 2003
and the new Communication dated 11 October 2004). Here the question  arises, according to the authors, 
whether the creation of a choice of European family law for internal cases could perhaps be a next step
The preliminary reports clearly show that the authors intend to apply European  fa
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arguments with respect to the necessity to make further progress towards the 
liberalisation of divorce law once divorces obtained under flexible conditions elsewhe
have been recognised: it seems logical to argue that anything that is ‘available
and that is ‘transferable’ to the country of origin should also be made ‘available’ in tha
country itself – first of all by means of flexible rules concerning jurisdiction and 
applicable law, and subsequently perhaps for those whose legal relationship manifests 
itself only in an internal context (because if they are refused access to such ‘rights’, th
would be a situation of reverse discrimination). It is conceivable that these arguments are
advanced even if they are not necessarily successful. The awareness and appreciation
these arguments and dynamics may both encourage people  to create liberal recognition 
rules and discourage them from doing so. Principles that are to be taken account of in
context include the principles of non-discrimination, fraud prevention, respect for cultural 
values in a society etc. However this may be, divorce law does seem to be undergoing an 
evolution at the moment, ranging from recognition rules to jurisdiction and applicable 
law rules, and this may ultimately result – as some people hope and others fear – in an 
evolution of the substantive divorce law of the Member States whose divorce law is 
currently not yet as liberal as that of other Member States. In this way, PIL may give rise 
to a kind of ‘backwards progression’. This is precisely what some people are hoping for 
and that others are fearing, if European divorce recognition rules are introduced or if 
European recognition rules concerning same-sex marriages were to be introduced – or if 
the European Court of Justice were to intervene along these lines in national PIL, in 
particular by forcing a Member State to recognise a same-sex marriage created 
elsewhere. After all, if a Member State has not introduced the concept of the same-sex 
marriage in its legal system, it is conceivable that this Member State, perhaps under 
pressure from the Court of Justice, may recognise a same-sex marriage concluded 
elsewhere, perhaps even in the hypothetical case that it concerns two of its own citizens; 
it is conceivable that the Court of Justice could compel this Member State to recognise 
the same-sex marriage – more or less by analogy with the Grunkin case.
re 
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53  
 
This reference to the Grunkin case brings us to a point that merits attention. In the  
Opinion in respect of the Grunkin case, reference was made to human rights principles. 
The question arises whether it is desirable and sufficient to impose European PIL rules 
only and exclusively where there are purely human rights issues – rights that are currently 
recognised as such – or can and should European interference extend further, in a process 
of liberalisation of international family law, in particular in areas where human rights are 
not discussed as yet.54 At this juncture, Europe is interfering with international divorce 
law in a far-reaching manner, but has not yet  intervened in issues involving same-sex 
                                                                                                       
ternal legal relationships in due course as well. Apparently, the strategy of the introduction of new 
legislation by means of PIL seems to be the path of least resistance in their eyes.  
in
53 Grunkin, C-96/04. The Opinion dates from 30 June 2005. The judgment dates from 27 April 2006. The 
judgment has fizzled out: the Court of Justice stated that “The Court of Justice of the European 
Communities has no jurisdiction to answer the question referred by the Amtsgericht Niebüll in its decision 
of 2 June 2003.” 
54 On this issue, see also the quotation from J. Meeusen, infra footnote 109, where he states that there 
should be an essential distinction between the way in which the European Court intervenes in cases 
involving human rights principles and other cases.  
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marriages. If European PIL rules in this field were to be issued, ‘injections’ and 
incentives of some sort would be given to the Member States.  
 
Moreover, if one reflects on the manner in which the introduction of specific PIL rules 
could be conducive to achieving the objective of human rights promotion, one should 
no means focus only on the ‘classical’ PIL rules of jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement. The significance and potential of internationally mandatory
rules, as they exist and are handled in PIL, should be taken into account as well. One 
question that needs to be addressed is whether OMC should be supported by the 
introduction or enforcement of internationally mandatory rules, if necessary, in a unif
form, as has happened, for example, in the Directive on Posting of Workers – because 
this Directive may well be considered a model of European unification of internationall
mandatory rules in the domain of international labour law, as far as the cross-border 
posting of employees is concerned; conceivably, it may be argued that it is neces
be able to use these rules as minimum standards in every respect – I refer to what was  
stated above
by 
 
ied 
y 
sary to 
 
ary to 
ly, the 
ly 
 
l situations, which have addressed the concrete 
uestion of whether these rules may be applicable as rules of normally applicable law in 
 
 
is 
y well be considered a manner of making the Member States’ confrontation 
ith one another’s  legal systems inevitable. PIL could offer possibilities of becoming 
est 
                                                
55 about the impact of the Directive on Services on this directive, especially
when it comes to the conversion of this directive from a minimum standard to a 
maximum standard. Thus, in order to promote human rights, it could become necess
harmonize internationally mandatory rules under specific conditions. Incidental
development – or at the very least the enforcement  – of specific rules as international
mandatory rules and the evaluation about whether these are to be used as minimum 
standards could relate not only to domains such as international labour law and 
international labour law, as interwoven with social security rights: this could also be
considered, for example, with respect to non-discrimination  legislation as such. In this 
context, I refer to analyses that have already been undertaken into the status of equal 
treatment legislation in internationa
q
the area of international tort law or international contract law, as ‘loi de police’ or as 
internationally mandatory rules.56 
 
Another way of considering PIL as a potential catalyst in promoting human rights can be 
defined as follows: it is possible to argue, for example, that once Member States are 
forced under certain circumstances to recognise concepts that have been achieved 
elsewhere, this could encourage them to ‘collective learning’57, as PIL may thus stimulate
reflection on the differences between legal systems, possibly stimulate that one becomes
more familiar with foreign rules through PIL and ultimately increase mutual trust; in th
way, PIL ma
w
familiar with one another’s legal systems and use this as a basis for evaluating the b
‘solution’.  
 
55 See above, under Part I, I.C.2.b.2. 
56 See, in particular, the publications by M. Traest and A.A. van Hoek, to which reference was made above  
(see supra Part I, I.C.3.). See also the Directive on Posting of Workers article 3 paragraph 1, g. 
57 PIL-lawyers often already try to use differences between the legal systems in a strategic way – e.g. in the 
frame of article 6 of the Rome Convention. See also in this context the information published on 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/ejn/ (European Justice Network).  
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PIL could then stimulate OMC, in the sense that the confrontation with other legal 
systems and  with ‘solutions’  in these other legal systems  – through the obligation of 
recognising the achievements of these other legal systems – could contribu
58
te towards the 
romotion of reflecting on a country’s own legal system  and towards a balanced choice 
een 
tems: through PIL, one may become familiar with foreign rules.  
p
in favour of ‘best practices’. PIL may thus stimulate reflection on the differences betw
legal sys
 
II.A.2. Giving substance to specific concepts used in EU leglisation in a well-defined 
manner 
PIL could act as a driving force in yet another way, namely by giving ‘substance’ to 
specific concepts used in European legislation in a well-defined manner59: specific PIL 
rules could be used in defining certain “terms” in Community legislation. This could 
concern, for example, family-law concepts such as those used in European Migrati
Directives.
on 
Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move freely 
60 For example, the Commission already argued during the preparation of the 
within the territory of the Member States that it has no jurisdiction to give further 
substance to family-law concepts itself61, but on the other hand, the Court of Justice does 
                                                 
58 On this issue (in particular the effects of the confrontation with other legal systems through PIL and the 
issue of a country’s reflecting on its own legal system), see also V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Thuisbrengen va
een op drift geraakte rechtsverhouding. Buitenlandse rechtswaarden in het personen- en familierecht’ 
[‘Identifying an Overheated Legal Relationship. Foreign Legal Values in the Law of Persons and Famil
Law’] in S. Parmentier et al. (ed.), Migranten kleuren het recht in. Over de bijdrage van vreemdelingen tot 
het recht [Migrants Colour the Law. On the Contribution of Aliens to the Law], Leuven: Acco 1997, pp. 
171-194, with further references. Admittedly, the first impressions are not very encouraging. Compare the 
question of whether the application of PIL rules in a well-defined manner could encourag
n 
y 
e other  legal 
is 
n 
 
pplication of the law of origin, following the choice of the persons concerned, in 
 
mber State’, and not the law of the country of origin that would determine if ‘the partner with 
), pp. 
 
systems to adjust their law: in this context, too, it is often claimed that there are major limitations – even if 
it is assumed that one is willing to do so and that one is of the opinion that PIL should be entrusted with th
task – with respect to the possibilities of exerting any influence on another legal system by means of PIL 
rules. Earlier PIL experiences may help to assess the foregoing in a ‘realistic’ manner.   
59 On this issue, see also the combined paper ‘Characteristics in Family Matters for Purposes of Europea
Private International Law, including Family Law Notions in EU/EC Acts and Instruments’ (L. Tomasi), 
‘The Interpretation of Family Law Notions by the EC Courts’ (C. Ricci) and ‘Principles of Interpretation 
and Characterisation in EC Private International Law and Family Matters’ (S. Bariatti), presented at the 
Meeting in Antwerp, October 2005 (and to be published in J. Meeusen, M. Pertegas, G. Straetmans, F. 
Swennen (eds.), International Family Law for the European Union, Antwerp: Intersentia 2006, in press). 
See also J.-Y. Carlier, comments with Chen (Case C-2000/02) Common Market Law Review 2005 August
issue 42, 4, pp. 1121-1131, in particular p. 1129, where he states  the following: ‘(…) the Garcia Avello 
case law could lead to the a
fields broader than only the name, such as family law or, on the contrary, it could be ‘the legislation of the
host Me
whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership’ should be recognized as a family member 
(Dir. 2004/38, Art. 2.2). 
60 On these Directives, see also O. De Schutter, ‘The implementation of the EU Charter’ (footnote 5
18-19. 
61 See the Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States (COM (2003) 199 def), p. 3: ‘Parliament’s amendments would recognize as family 
members the spouse of the same sex in the same way as the spouse of a different sex, the registered partner
in accordance with the legislation of the Member State of origin, and non-married partners in accordance 
with the legislation of practice of the host or home Member State. On this point, the Commission feels that 
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have the power to check specific PIL aspects. By giving well-defined substance to this 
PIL regulation, it would then be possible to give an injection to the development of 
family-law concepts in, for example, European migration law.62  
 
II.B. Negative effects of PIL 
Reflecting on the potential role of PIL in the project in this second sense – namely 
functioning as a catalyst in promoting human rights, and as a hinge – I believe that, if the 
conclusion is drawn that PIL can indeed act as a catalyst, it can do so only if well-defined 
PIL rules are used and if specific parameters are satisfied. It is also particularly important 
to focus attention on any negative effects of the introduction of PIL rules: it is important 
to pay attention to PIL rules which could possibly slow down and impede human rights 
protection and which could contribute to a backlash. PIL could then function as a break in 
the race towards the promotion of human rights in the European Union. Ultimately, the 
necessary adaptation to European PIL rules by Member States could be used as an excuse 
by some of them to slow down the process of fully accommodating to mutual recognition 
obligations, relying on transitory disparities between legal systems. 
 
II.B.1. The risk that PIL Rules may serve as an ‘excuse’ to stop further evolution 
It should be recognised that PIL rules may also slow down the promotion of human 
rights. As such, one should always be alert to any potentially  ‘perverse’ and 
counterproductive effects of PIL. Issues that merit attention include the   extent to which 
PIL may be used as an ‘excuse mechanism’, an alibi as it were, where Member States 
may argue that they definitely – up to a certain  point – accept specific principles, but that 
they cannot be forced to go further than that: for example, would it be legitimate to argue 
that it is sufficient for a Member State to declare that it is prepared to recognise decisions 
made or achievements realised elsewhere subject to certain conditions, but that it need 
not organise this possibility in the Member State itself ? ‘Up to that point but not any 
further’, could that be the consequence? In my opinion, one should realise at the very 
least that arguments of this kind will be advanced, evaluate the chances of such 
arguments and how regrettable it would be if the ‘evolution’ would stop at that point: 
should a situation like that be appreciated as being sufficient, as the best possible result, 
possibly as the ‘second best solution’, as in an international context, at least, people who 
are mobile and/or have a link with a foreign legal system are able to get what they want 
                                                                                                                                                 
tion, 
an area which does not fall within the Community’s legislative jurisdiction.’ (The Commission also argued 
“with regard to partners, whether they be registered partners or unmarried partners, the Commission is also 
harmonization of the conditions of residence for Union citizens in Member States of which they are not 
nationals must not result in the imposition on certain Member States of amendments to family legisla
of the opinion that recognition of such situations must be based exclusively on the legislation of the host 
Member State. Recognition for purposes of residence of non-married couples in accordance with the 
legislation of others Member States could pose problems for the host Member States if its family law does 
not recognize this possibility. To confer rights which are not recognized in the case of its own nationals on 
couples from other Member States could in fact create reverse discrimination, which the Commission 
would prefer to avoid.”        
62 On this philosophy, see also V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Communitarization of international family law as 
seen from a Dutch perspective: what is new ? A prospective analysis’, in A. Nuyts and N. Watté (ed.), 
International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations with Third States, Bruxelles Bruylant 2005, pp. 509-
561.  
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and may even be able to have this result recognised when they return to their own 
countries? Then, the final result would be that specific rights are ‘available’ and possibly
even ‘transferable’ for, at least, a number of people. Or should we always have the 
ambition to achieve more than that; and if we have this ambition, to what extent should
we expect PIL rules to create a domino effect, or to what extent should we fear that PIL 
rules will slow down further deve
 
 
lopments? Attempts to find the answer to questions of 
is kind could help us make our choice of specific kinds of PIL rules as specific rules 
 
th
aimed at promoting human rights. PIL analyses, including analyses of earlier experiences,
could be helpful in this respect.   
 
II.B.2. Risk of introducing principles such as ‘mutual recognition’ by using the ‘country-
of-origin principle’ and present these as PIL rules  
It is quite certain that there are risks in connection with the protection of humans ri
some domains if principles such as the country-of-origin principle are used and are even 
represented as PIL rules. There is the risk that this principle may change existing PIL 
rules in a rather drastic manner and involve the obligation of ‘mutual recognition’ 
without any further conditions or guarantees – for example, the preceding harm
and organisation of minimum protection
ghts in 
onisation 
ed to 
oncerning the existence of a ‘genuine’ link before anything can be 
cognised, etc. At this point, I once again refer to the discussions about this principle as 
Rome II-
63 (which, in addition, should not be allow
function as a model of maximum protection) – in the substantive law of Member States 
or through harmonisation of internationally mandatory rules, or in the sense of 
requirements c
re
enshrined in the Directive on Services, the E-commerce Directive, the 
proposal…64 
 
III. PIL as a source of inspiration as for how to deal with externalities 
III.A. Introduction 
PIL analyses could be useful in a broader sense and this brings us to the third potenti
role to be played by PIL in the project: PIL may be considered a discipline that has long
been confronted with aspects of ‘externalities’ and human rights and has thus been abl
gain wide experience in addressing several issues that are relevant in discussing the 
position and development of human rights in Europe.
al 
 
e to 
r I.), 
s rather how the promotion of human rights could have 
n impact on PIL in a direct way (see under I.C.2.a.) and/or in an indirect way (see under 
                                                
65 Thus the question arises if it is 
useful to pay attention to PIL issues because PIL can be considered a discipline from 
which lessons can be learned in a more general way. In this context, debates on human 
rights within PIL are interesting to study – whereas above, on the one hand (see unde
the interesting issue to study wa
a
 
63 See also O. De Schutter, ‘Monitoring Human Rights in the Union as a Learning Process’ and O. De 
Schutter and S. Francq (footnote 35), nr. 10 and nr. 25.  
64 See already above, e.g. under Part I, I.C.2.b.2. See also, on mutual recognition if family matters, the 
comments of J. Meeusen (see e.g. below, under Part I, III.B.).   
65 This could be placed in the context of what De Schutter describes as a function of OMC in ‘The 
implementation of the EU Charter’ (footnote 5), pp. 3-4: ‘(…), the open method of coordination could be 
an adequate means of better reconciling the requirements of market (economic) freedoms constitutive of 
the internal market, with human rights, especially social rights, which the Member States are bound to 
protect and implement under their jurisdiction.’ Possibly, PIL could help to find such ‘means of better 
reconciling’!    
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I.C.2.b.) and, on the other hand (see under II) how PIL could have an impact on the 
promotion of human rights.      
 
Now, should the EU legislator, when facing EU human rights issues, take the solutions 
ached in the PIL domain into account and take advantage of them; could the EU 
y 
 
, 
 
s 
ed and 
iscussed by Lawson.  This matter could now be considered from the PIL perspective, 
e debates 
bout ‘availability’ and ‘transferability’ in PIL, taking account of arguments advanced 
 the past as well as with arguments that are  
re
legislator learn from PIL concepts of transferability, availability, international harmon
etc.?     
 
For my part, I am not convinced that PIL can immediately provide full and adequate 
answers that are convincing for everybody, but I am of the opinion that it is worth 
looking into the debates that have been and are still being conducted in PIL circles, the
arguments used in these debates, the importance attached to these insights and arguments
etc. In this context, it is certainly worth analysing concepts such as the ‘availability’ of 
rights – both in relation to issues of jurisdiction law, applicable law and in relation to 
recognition and enforcement, as well as the concept of ‘transferability’. In this way, one 
will probably be confronted with arguments and concepts with respect to how to avoid
class justice, fraud, ‘shopping’ et cetera, which  have already been used in PIL debates 
about such issues as divorce and repudiation. Incidentally, the issue of ‘availability’ wa
also raised in the Casus Cha’are shalom ve tsedek v. France case66, as explain
67d
within the context of the Europeanisation of PIL, in which context, principles such as 
‘liberal access to justice’, ‘no-loss-of-rights’ and the like seem to be crucial.   
 
In a more general sense, the hypothesis would be that it is instructive to analys
a
and evaluated in ‘classical’ PIL discussions in
evaluated at this juncture in the ‘new’ context of the Europeanisation of PIL.  
 
III.B. ‘Transferability’ issues in PIL debates 
PIL issues concerning ‘transferability’ are basically about the possibilities of 
mportation’, and sometimes also problems in connection with ‘exportability’. 
f 
ated 
 
er 
y simply prohibiting the creation of such legal 
lationship, this kind of anticipation may well act as a brake. Arguments like this were 
‘i
‘Importability’ issues are raised in the context of recognition and enforcement – one o
the three classical PIL issues.  
 
Exportability issues are relevant when the question arises whether and if so, in what 
manner, a Member State should take account of the fact that a legal relationship cre
in this Member State may not be recognised in another Member State. If Member State A
takes account of Member State B’s non-recognition of what would be created in Memb
State A in an anticipatory manner b
re
                                                 
66 ECHR decision dated 27 June 2000, Judgment in the Cha’are shalom ve tsedek v. France Case.  
67 R. Lawson, “The Monitoring of Fundamental Rights in the Union as a Contribution to the European 
Legal Space (III): the Role of the European Court of Human Rights”. 
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already advanced in Dutch PIL discussions about same-sex marriages68, but were put 
aside at the end of the day.            
 
In this context, it is fascinating to draw attention to the Dutch statutory provision laid 
down in Section 3(2) of the Marriages (Conflict of Laws) Act (Wet Conflictenrecht 
Huwelijk), which provides that the solemnisation of a marriage may not be refused on 
ground that, under the law of a State of which one of the future spouses posses
nationality, there is an impediment to such solemnisation that is in breach of Dutch public 
policy: accordingly, a foreign impediment to a marriage that is designated as being in 
breach of public policy in the Netherlands, should not be taken heed of in the 
Netherlands, even if this means that a marriage may be created that will not be 
in the country where this impediment is in force. It is also fascinating in this context t
draw attention to a German court decision
the 
ses the 
recognised  
o 
 
an  
involved the fundamental right to marry in its assessment and 
ermitted the parties to marry in Germany, even though it had been argued earlier during 
 
ny right whether it concerns a 
uman right as such. Debates on this issue are also centred on the question of how all this 
a context of stimulating the internal market and  
69 that involved a marriage to be solemnised in 
Germany between a German divorcee and a Spanish man, where there was an 
impediment under Spanish law in respect of divorcees, which meant that a marriage 
solemnised despite this impediment abroad could not be recognised either. The Germ
Constitutional Court 
p
the proceedings that the parties had to be protected against the negative effects of a 
‘limping marriage’. 
 
Any debates on this issue are centred on the possibility of using the non-recognisability in
the one Member State of achievements in another Member State as an argument to 
withhold rights in that other Member State. Debates on this issue are also centred on the 
question of the extent to which it is relevant in assessing a
h
is to be evaluated in a European context – 
the creation of room for freedom, security and justice.      
 
III.C. ‘Availability’ issues in PIL debates 
‘Availability’ issues in PIL may be raised in the context of PIL debates concerning  
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement. If one considers the PIL 
ebates in a ‘European context’, it turns out that these issues are also connected with  the 
n’ 
d
difficulty of the separation of ‘intra-Community’ situations from other situations, as I will 
explain under III.D.  
 
First and foremost, as far as the jurisdiction debate is concerned, it is worth remembering 
that there were times when people were almost systematically ‘sent back’ to their ‘ow
                                                 
68 On this subject, see, for example, V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘De wisselwerking tussen materieel recht en 
internationaal privaatrecht: eenrichtings- of tweerichtingsverkeer?’ [‘The Interaction between Substantive 
Law and Private International Law: One-Way or Two-Way Traffic?’], Rechtskundig Weekblad 1999-2000, 
pp. 1249-1265.  
69 Decision of the German Constitutional Court of 4 May 1971 (RCDIP 1974, pp. 72-75). On this issue, 
see, e.g., V. Van Den Eeckhout, Huwelijk en echtscheiding in het Belgische conflictenrecht. Een analyse 
vanuit de invalshoek van nationaliteitsgemengde partnerverhoudingen [Marriage and Divorce in Belgian 
Private International Law. An Analysis from the Angle of Mixed Nationality Partner Relationships], 
Antwerp: Intersentia 1998,  pp. 300-301. See also infra Part II, I.B.2.c.1. 
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national institutions if they wanted any right to be upheld. Arguments based on ‘access to 
justice’ may be advanced against such conduct. In this day and age, it often happens that 
institutions of several countries are competent at the same time. Where litigation in a 
specific country could yield an advantage in the procedure (for example, in terms of the 
law to be applied), parties are able to make a strategic choice. Placing it in a broader 
context, potential debates on this issue are centred on the assessment of well-known PIL 
chniques and ‘solutions’, such as the ‘forum (non) conveniens’, the ‘forum necessitatis’, 
ss 
ay 
 
t has 
ders. 
 
y 
d other European countries  – and at this juncture, this is relevant in the 
ontext of PIL rules concerning same-sex marriages. In these discussions arguments 
 
about the possibilities and limitations in respect of party autonomy that have been held 
e now – on the issue of choice of law, see also what was stated above74 in 
                    
te
the use of jurisdiction rules such as ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ rules, attempts to avoid ‘cla
justice’70,  evaluating the argument that the one court, institution or country may be in a 
better position to apply a specific law, that this specific court, institution or country m
have more knowledge71 and experience in this field and for this reason people had best be
referred to that court, institution or country etc.        
 
Second, as far as the other procedural PIL question is concerned – the recognition and 
enforcement question – this is about the possibility of recognising in country A wha
been obtained in country B. Should anything obtained in country B be recognised in 
country A if this right or possibility was not ‘available’ in country A itself, one won
And if country A recognises anything in a situation like that, may this willingness to 
recognise then be used as an excuse for not recognising this right in the country A itself?
In this context, it is worth remembering the experiences of the possibility or impossibilit
of the conclusion of civil marriages in Lebanon, ‘getting’  a divorce abroad by the 
citizens of countries where divorce used to be prohibited at the time72, repudiation in 
France an 73
c
relating to the significance of ‘fraud’ are advanced, the assessment of the necessity that
the parties have a specific ‘link’ with a legal system, the possibilities and limitations of 
‘shopping’ for parties whose legal relationship is defined in an international context, the 
fear of creating a situation that may lead to a ‘race to the court by the strongest party’, 
etc.         
 
Finally, as far as applicable law is concerned, it is worth remembering the discussions 
for a long tim
the context of the Ingmar case – the possibilities parties may have to convert a purely  
                             
e 
o 
he birth 
red for the purpose of helping a sick child born earlier, and where this 
m.     
uman Rights 
70 This means that there could be class justice if only people who can afford, time-wise or financially, to 
travel to that other country  where a right may be recognised under the applicable law may have effective 
access to this right.  
71 The argument that a country may have knowledge or expertise that is lacking in another country and that 
it is therefore reasonable under certain conditions to require people to go to that other country reminds m
of an issue that recently hit the headlines in the Netherlands: this was about Dutch people who had gone t
Belgian hospitals with highly developed technological expertise not present in the Netherlands, for t
of their child that had been fathe
conduct seemed to be assessed as ‘contrary to human dignity’ in the Netherlands but not in  Belgiu
72 Cfr. In this context the Case of Johnston and others v. Ireland, European Court of H
Judgment 18 December 1986.   
73 With respect to France, see, for example, the Simitch case law. On this subject, see V. Van Den 
Eeckhout, Huwelijk en echtscheiding in het Belgische conflictenrecht (footnote 69). 
74 Compare supra Part I, I.C.2.b.1. 
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internal legal relationship into an international legal relationship (for example, by using  
the choice of law option if this ‘internationalisation’ of the legal relationship could be 
advantageous for them75) – the conversion from an internal into an international legal 
lationship could be more attractive, for example, if the parties are able to obtain another  
ty 
re
– more advantageous – applicable law than the one that normally applies to their internal 
legal relationship76 – etc.   
 
III.D. Scope and characteristics of Community law – delimitation of intra-Communi
cases and the issue of reverse discrimination 
As for the dichotomy between ‘internal’ and ‘international’ cases, problems like tho
relevant in the Ingmar case, allegations concerning reverse discrimination etc., it is 
appropriate in this context to refer to the distinction between intra-Community cases and  
non-intra-Community cases – where the latter may comprise both ‘purely national 
situations’ and international situations that are ‘extra-Community’. In that case, the 
discussions about the extent to which differences in  approach between intra-Comm
and non-intra-Community cases are justified are also relevant
se 
unity 
ome observations about the difficulties and complications in respect of the 
istinction between internal and international cases, and between intra-Community cases 
 
ns 
 another 
 
ot 
77. At this juncture, there 
are developments in this area and pregnant questions need to be addressed.78 Below, I 
will make s
d
and other international family law cases. The latter applies by analogy to some other PIL
domains.  
 
In international family law, the Garcia Avello case79 reveals that the sociological reality 
of migration – and, consequently, the sociological reality of the underlying PIL questio
– is currently quite diverse.80 This means, for example, that descendants from mobile EU 
citizens, who have never migrated themselves, may still possess the nationality of
EU Member State and may subsequently claim rights from an EU perspective.81 As a
matter of fact, the personal exercise of the right of free movement within Europe does n
need to be confined to the mobility stage but may sometimes result in permanent 
establishment as well. In addition, the Baldinger case82 shows that this is sometimes 
                                                 
75 In this context, see, for example, Article 3(3) of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations, which provides as follows: ‘The fact that the parties have chosen a foreig
 
n law, 
whether or not accompanied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all the other elements 
relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are connected with one country only, prejudice the 
application of rules of the law at the country which cannot be derogated from by contract, hereinafter called 
‘mandatory rules.’  
76 On this issue, see also my remarks in Part II below about the problems of international environmental 
pollution and Article 7 of the Rome II proposal. 
77 Cfr. The discussions raised by the Inspire-case of the Court of Justice (C-167/01, Judgment dated 30 
September 2003). 
78 See also V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Tien jaar Europees internationaal privaatrecht’ (footnote 1), especially 
p. 298 and pp. 300-301. I repeat a passage from this contribution.  
79 Garcia Avello, C-148/02, Judgment dated 2 October 2003. 
80 In this context, see also the Opinion rendered by Advocate General Geelhoed dated 27 February 2003 in 
the Hacene Akrich case , C-109/01. 
81 And see, for example, in this context also the Chen case (C-200/02, 19 October 2004), concerning a child  
with and parents without EU nationality.  
82 See the Baldinger decision, C-386/02, decision dated 16 September 2004. 
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followed by naturalisation in the country to which the person concerned has migrated, 
which may involve the transition from an ‘internal legal relationship’, through a 
‘European legal relationship’ to a ‘foreign internal legal relationship’. In this kind of 
situation, the newly acquired legal position could turn out to be more advantageous
more disadvantageous than that held by the EU citizens in that ‘new  country’ – and than
that held by the person himself before the migration. Variations are possible: the 
originally ‘internal legal relationships’ may also, after first having become ‘Europ
become ‘internal’ again, in particular where the person concerned returns to the countr
of origin – see also the Singh and Hacene Akrich case.
 or 
 
ean’, 
y 
onger 
e, 
s 
n 
ps  
ity – 
m losing 
 
is 
.’ 
nal 
83 Confronted with situations of 
this kind, the European legislator has to address questions relating to the scope of 
jurisdiction, and relating to the line of action to be adopted if they want to persist in the 
idea of stimulating free movement. A case that is not yet intra-Community or no l
intra-Community, where it is always possible to draw a distinction between the  
hypothesis that the case does not have any international elements anyway, or where it 
does have international elements, which do not make it into an intra-Community cas
however. To my mind, decisions that extend beyond the scope of PIL, like the decisions 
in the Singh and Baldinger cases84, appear to be highly relevant in this context, because it 
is interesting to study the Court of Justice’s considerations in these cases, and to 
subsequently examine the extent to which the same or other considerations and concern
should play a role in PIL issues. To what extent should there be a focus, for example i
PIL issues relating to the free movement of persons, on the aspect and objective of 
avoiding  limping relationships85 – in the light of the fact that limping legal relationshi
could pose a problem in cases involving mobility, and which could slow down mobil
or also,  possibly as an independent issue, the objective of preventing people fro
their rights in the case of mobility – given the fact that the loss of rights in the case of
mobility may well discourage people from exercising their right of free movement in 
actual practice. This may, for example, be related to the consideration in the Baldinger 
case, where Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer took the following ground in h
Opinion dated 11 December 200386: ‘Although citizenship of the Union is not itself 
capable of conferring the full range of rights which are traditionally attached to 
membership of a political community, it must at least guarantee that it is possible to 
change nationality within the European Union without suffering any legal disadvantage
Placed against the background of current migration law – partly controlled by natio
institutions, partly at the European level, see, for example, the Directive on Family 
                                                 
83 Singh (Singh C-370/90, 1992, ECR I-4265) and Hacene Akrich (23 September 2003, C-109/01). Anot
case worth mentioning is Jia (C-1/05), in which case the Opinion is rendered on 27 April  2006. 
84 Also on the basis of the analysis of the Baldinger case, it turns out that in specific cases
her 
, considering  
 
, 
nefiting, in one Member State of which they are nationals, from the legal effects of 
r documents drawn up in the surname recognised in another Member State of which they are 
. 
specific rights as a ‘social advantage’ may offer a solution, but that this is not always the case. In this 
context, see also the Reed case (judgment dated 17 April 1986 (59/85), ECR, p. 1283).    
85 Likewise, it was also considered in Garcia Avello (C-148/02, Judgment dated 2 October 2003, no. 36 of 
the judgment) that ‘(…) it is common ground that (such a) discrepancy in surnames is liable to cause
serious inconvenience for those concerned at both professional and private levels resulting from, inter alia
difficulties in be
diplomas o
also nationals.’ 
86 No. 47
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Reunification87 – this could be perceived as being very pregnant indeed. For example, if 
a legal relationship is first considered to be an ‘internal Belgian matter’, but is then 
classified as an ‘intra-Community matter’ by the exercise of the right of free movem
after which it becomes ‘an internal Dutch matter’ by naturalisation, could the persons 
involved lose the ’acquired’ family reunification rights they held under Belgian or 
European law, and could the regime applicable to them change to such an extent that it  
would be unattractive for them to opt for acquiring Dutch nationality by na
ent, 
turalisation, if 
 turns out, for example, that the possibilities of having a non-European partner come 
a 
 the current ‘European context’, ‘classical’ arguments and views would then have to be 
ion to  
e also the 
in the national migration law – 90, accompanied by the European 
it
over will change to a great extent? The question arises to what extent the European 
legislator will address such issues affecting EU citizens in the future, and how traditional 
PIL arguments and views in relation, for example, to the concern for international 
harmony and the preservation of rights in the case of migration should be assessed from 
European perspective, from the perspective of human rights promotion.88  
 
In
evaluated, taking account of the views, for example, of the Court of Justice in relat
‘fraud’ – for example in international company law, the Inspire case89; se
Hacene Akrich Case and the Jia Case concerning migration law, including issues about 
the possibility to mainta
commitment to a ‘liberal access to justice’ etc. 
 
PART II. TENSIONS BETWEEN PIL AND EU LAW: RISK OF 
EXACERBATION OF REGULATORY COMPETITION 
SCENARIOS    
1) PIL versus EU Law 
When principles are discussed in a European context, it turns out, on closer inspecti
that European principles and objectives are sometimes consistent and at other times  
inconsistent with PIL. In Part II of this Paper, I will try to explore the relationship 
between PIL on the one hand and European objectives, such as stimulating the internal 
                                                
on, 
 
87 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 concerning the Law of Family Reunification, OJ L 
251/12. 
88 This touches on the interdependencies between European law, PIL, nationality law and aliens law. On 
these interdependencies (including interdependencies between PIL and social security law), see also V. Van 
Den Eeckhout, ‘Communitarization of international family law as seen from a Dutch perspective’, see, 
specifically, p. 552 ff in relation to nationality law (in this context, see the decisions in cases such as  
Micheletti (C-369/90 (1992) ECR I-4239), Mesbah (11 November 1999, no. C-179/98) and Manjit Kaur 
(20 February 2001, C-192/99), as for the problems of dual nationality, see also P. Lagarde, Comments with 
Garcia Avello 2 October 2003, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 2004, p. 192-202. And see also 
the recent judgment in the Netherlands RvSt 29 March 2006, JV 2006/172 comments CAG, which 
concerned a person with both Dutch and Moroccan nationality,  who wanted to derive rights from the 
Directive on Family Reunification.  
89 Inspire, C-167/01, Judgment dated 30 September 2003 (see also Centros, C-212/97, Judgment dated on 9 
March 1999 and Uberseering, C-208/00, Judgment dated on 5 November 2002).  
90 See supra, footnote 83. On analogies with issues in migration law (as they come forward in the case of 
Hacene Akrich and Jia) and on the aspect of fraud prevention in a European context, also in the context of 
sham marriages, see, for example, V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Communitarization of International Family 
Law’ (footnote 62) and J. Meeusen, ‘System Shopping in European private international law in family 
matters’ (footnote 52). 
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market, protecting the European fundamental freedoms (freedom of movement, freedom 
of establishment etc.), preserving the principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality, and in addition, the position of human rights, on the other hand. If one 
considers the potential tensions between current European dynamics on the one hand and 
IL on the other hand, one of the crucial questions to be addressed is whether there is a 
 
the 
ition 
’ 
d 
 PIL and the EU 
 of origin 
rinciple in the original proposal for a Service Directive – a principle lacking as such in 
PIL acquis in international labour law; the 
P
risk that there will be a trend towards increased ‘regulatory competition’.  If this is the 
case, what will be the position of the doctrine of human rights and the ambition to 
promote these? ‘Which side’ should advocates of the promotion of human rights favour, 
if tensions arise between European incentives on the one hand, and old PIL developments
on the other hand?; and should it be welcomed if European incentives and international 
PIL developments coincide from the perspective of human rights promotion, or had these 
developments be best discouraged?   
 
In general, from the promotion of human rights perspective, a first analysis justifies 
conclusion that sometimes PIL lawyers had best oppose European incentives, but at other 
times they had better support these European incentives, where they encounter oppos
from the PIL field:  at first sight, the interaction between European tendencies, ‘modern
PIL and human rights may vary depending on the legal domain of PIL; in quite general 
terms, a distinction could be made between international family law on the one hand, an
PIL with the exception of family law on the other hand. I will explain this briefly below.  
 
I will focus on some issues where there might be conflicts between
acquis/EU-objectives on the same domain. Both in international labour law, international 
tort law and international family law, it will be possible to distinguish, to a larger or 
smaller degree, visible fields of conflicts, e.g. where one looks at the country
p
PIL and conflicting at some points with the 
principle to favour the weak party, present in international tort law, but still to be worked 
out further in EU Law; the EU-tendency to stimulate liberal international family law, 
conflicting with the national PIL rules of some Member States.     
 
First, I will make two remarks about the nature of PIL and how it should be understood in 
this context, as well as the implications of that for an analysis as proposed.   
 
I.A. Two preliminary and general remarks  
I.A.1. Remark about ‘the essence’ of PIL and its implication in analyzing the interaction 
between PIL, European incentives and human rights  
First and foremost, it should be emphasized that, if one raises the question whether 
European tendencies conflict with ‘the nature of PIL’, the manner of assessing its nature 
an lawyer 
 
modern PIL, or the other way round. Thus, it could make a difference in analysis if one 
examines the interaction between PIL, European incentives and human rights, either 
defining PIL in the actual, modern sense, or falling back on the traditional view on PIL.      
can vary: when talking about the ‘nature of PIL’, are we talking about the ‘nature’ of PIL 
in the sense of ‘traditional’ PIL - mainly based on the heritance of the Germ
Von Savigny, characterised by ‘neutral’ PIL -, or in the sense of ‘modern’ PIL – PIL as 
evolved after Von Savigny. Tensions might appear with traditional PIL, but not with
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My own analysis of the tensions is based on my observation that – as I indicated above91 
– PIL, as currently applicable, has regularly been subject to tendencies of 
instrumentalisation or attempts thereto, even before the recent process of Europeanization
of PIL, and before European influence on PIL was exerted, as in this day and age.   
In international labour law, for example, the principle of the protection of the w
– the employee – has been widely adopted
 
eak party 
ean 
ave 
n, or on 
n, 
nvironmental pollution if PIL rules are applicable, as these could enhance the 
e victim to choose between different legal systems.  
 mean 
pean 
92; it can even be argued that, at the Europ
level, this has resulted in some ‘acquis’ in this context, such as the Brussels Convention 
on the Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters    
and the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
International tort law has been confronted with modern incentives, too, which h
resulted in a greater focus than in the past on the victim’s position and protectio
legal-political objectives, such as the fight against international environmental pollutio
which is shown by the rules concerning jurisdiction and applicable law included in 
various treaties or in national PIL. It could even be advantageous to victims of 
e
possibilities for recovering damages, and therefore offer better chances, compared to 
victims whose cases are merely defined by national legislation – this could, for example, 
be the case if PIL rules allow th
 
Nowadays, there is a pluralism of methods in PIL. Where I refer to ‘PIL’ below, I
‘modern PIL’. Thus, below, I will focus on tensions between modern PIL, Euro
incentives and human rights.   
 
I.A.2. Remark about the basically ‘national’ nature of PIL and its implications in 
analyzing the interaction between PIL, European incentives and human rights 
The remarks made above concerning the ‘essence’ of PIL require an additional remark, i
particular, concerning the originally national origin of PIL. If one looks into the 
compatibility of European incentives on PIL (tendencies to instrumentalise PIL for 
European purposes) with the ‘essence’ of PIL – in respect of which I stated that I focus 
on PIL as it has developed to date – one faces the complication of the basically national 
nature of PIL. Sometimes, PIL has been unified at a supranational level – European or 
otherwise – but sometim
n 
es this is not the case. These different situations – a situation of 
nification (on a European or non-European level) of PIL or a situation where PIL is still 
 a different approach when trying to promote human rights in 
r 
u
regulated on a pure national basis -, deriving from the essential, might require a certain 
alertness and possibly even
a European context.      
 
A first consequence is that one should be aware that ‘modern PIL’ may be of European o
of non-European origin.   
Sometimes modern ‘modern PIL’ has a common basis in European Member States – 
see, for example, the rules concerning international labour law as incorporated into the 
                                                 
91 See supra Part I, I.C.1. 
92 See also, e.g., M.V. Polak, ‘‘Laborum Dulce Lenimen’ ? Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Aspects of 
Employment Contracts’, in J. Meeusen, M. Pertegas and G. Straetmans, Enforcement of international 
contracts in the European Union: convergence and divergence between ‘Brussels I’ and ‘Rome I’, 
Antwerp: Intersentia 2004, pp. 323-342. 
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Brussels Convention, which has by now been transformed into a regulation concerning 
jurisdiction, recognition and execution, and as incorporated into the Rome Convention 
n the Law applicable to Contractual Obligations. In such a situation, one could refer to 
rnational family law.   
 
 
r – de lege 
ped 
 
 mean that lawyers who wish to promote human rights will 
 their national PIL or to leave it intact in their 
o
a type of ‘acquis communautaire’ in European PIL, which may come under pressure 
from new European incentives.    
But sometimes ‘modern PIL’ may also vary substantially between the Member States – 
his is the case, for example, in specific domains of intet
 
A second consequence of the essentially national nature of PIL is that if one discusses the
convergence and/or tensions between ‘modern’ PIL and European tendencies, in their 
interactions with human rights, and if one wishes to define proposals on the position to be 
taken, this may involve two separate types of action.   
 
First and foremost, this could mean that lawyers who wish to promote human rights will
ropose adherence and consolidation to the ‘acquis communautaire’,  op
ferenda - the partial abandonment of the acquis communautaire, as it has been develo
in European PIL to date – to the extent that it is advantageous or disadvantageous to 
adhere to such acquis communautaire, from the perspective of human rights promotion. 
This assessment should be made in domains where there is  acquis communautaire and
where there are tensions between this acquis and European incentives. 
 
Subsequently, this could
encourage specific Member States to adjust
efforts to develop their own national, ‘modern’ PIL.  Such choices should be made 
al possible in domains where PIL is still mainly national or, where there is supranation
PIL, where unification was not achieved at the European level.  
 
I.B. Three case-studies 
I.B.1. Two case-studies in patrimonial law 
I.B.1. Introduction: some aspects of international labour law and international tort law 
in 
eak 
s 
n the Law 
pplicable to Contractual Obligations and the plans for the conversion of this 
                                                
First, I will make some comments on international patrimonial law, in particular, 
respect of international labour law and tort law.    
If one considers ‘modern’ PIL in relation to international labour law and ‘modern’ PIL 
in relation to tort law, one finds that these fields have undergone change and  
‘modernisation’ under the influence of principles such as the protection of the w
party, the protection of the victim and attention for human rights principles. The 
relevant rules have sometimes been incorporated into legislation harmonised at the 
European level.93 In the field of international labour law, examples include the Brussel
Convention and the Brussels Regulation, the European Convention o
A
convention into a regulation. In the field of international tort law, the Brussels 
Convention and the Brussels Regulation are important as well; at the European level, 
 
93 Even though there may exist national differences in that case. On this issue, see, for example, A.A.H. van 
Hoek, Internationale mobiliteit van werknemers (footnote 16), for example, p. 96. 
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there are no harmonised rules of applicable law as yet, but they are being prepared, in 
particular, in the context of the proposal for a ‘Rome II’ regulation.  
 
The conversion of the Brussels Convention into a regulation did not involve any 
fundamental discussions or revisions in respect of rules of jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement in the field of international labour law and international tort law. But deba
are currently being held on specific aspects of the proposal for a Rome II Regulation an
a Rome I Regulation – concerning rules of applicable law in the area of unlawful acts 
(‘torts’) and contracts, respectively.     
 
ntriguingly, the Explanatory Memorandum
tes 
d 
es that one of 
e protection of the 
ssed in the context of the law applicable to international 
 
                                                
I 94 to the Rome II Proposal argu
Europe’s objectives and concerns is the fight against environmental pollution, and, 
accordingly, Article 7 of the Proposal allows the victim to choose the most favourable 
law.95 The fight against environmental pollution turns out to be an objective that is  
considered so relevant as to have PIL regulations prepared in a manner useful for this 
purpose and in line with modern tendencies in respect of international tort law as well. 
But what about the objective of human rights promotion?, one wonders.   
 
n the above Rome II proposal, the human rights issue, such as thI
freedom of expression, was discu
defamation. And the principle of employee protection was discussed in the context of 
international labour law in connection with the preparation of the Directive on Services.
In February 2006, both the proposal for a Rome II Regulation and the proposal for the 
Directive on Services were changed fundamentally96, but even so, these issues are 
illustrative examples and may serve as interesting case studies.  
 
 
94 See the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal, pp. 18-19. The passage deserves to be quoted: ‘The 
basic connection to the law of the place where the damage was sustained is in conformity with recent 
objectives of environmental protection policy, which tends to support strict liability. The solution is also 
conducive to a policy of prevention, obliging operators established in countries with a low level of 
protection to abide by the higher levels of protection in neighbouring countries, which removes the 
incentive for an operator to opt for low-protection countries. The rule thus contributes to raising the general 
level of environmental protection. But the exclusive connection to the place where the damage is sustained 
would also mean that a victim in a low-protection country would not enjoy the higher level of protection 
available in neighbouring countries. Considering the Union’s more general objectives in environmental 
matters, the point is not only to respect the victim’s legitimate interests but also to establish a legislative 
policy that contributes to raising the general level of environmental protection, especially as the author of 
the environmental damage, unlike other tort or delicts, generally derives an economic benefit from his 
harmful activity. Applying exclusively the law of the place where the damage is sustained would give an 
operator an incentive to establish his facilities at the border so as to discharge toxic substances into a river 
and enjoy the benefit of the neighbouring country’s laxer rules. This solution would be contrary to the 
underlying philosophy of the European substantive law of the environment and the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle.’        
95 Article 7 reads as follows:  ‘The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a violation 
of the environment shall be the law determined by the application of Article 3(1), unless the person 
sustaining damage prefers to base his claim on the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the 
damage occurred.’   
96 See the Amended Proposal for Rome II COM (2006) 83 final, p. 18. In the new Rome II proposal (…), 
the entire issue of ‘international defamation’ was taken out of the sphere of application.   
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I.B.1.b. International labour law 
As far as international labour law is concerned, the original proposal for a Directive on 
Services has caused quite a stir, also among PIL lawyers, in particular because the 
inclusion of the country-of-origin principle would put great pressure on ‘modern
Specifically, this principle would result or would have resulted in changes in the rules 
regarding international employment contracts withou
’ PIL. 
t any prior harmonisation or 
uarantees of minimum employee protection: the changes would relate or would have 
  
 discussions about the Directive on Services, it may become clear why the tendency to 
ct 
 
ployee 
Naturally, the foregoing is currently considered from the perspective of the protection 
g
related to applicable law and internationally mandatory rules. De Schutter and Francq97 
showed in a recent analysis the extent to which the Directive on Posting of Workers, for 
example, would be transformed from a model of minimum to one of maximum 
protection, and how the foregoing, in view of the consequences of the Inspire case, could
result in far-reaching ‘regulatory competition’.         
 
In
liberalise and stimulate the internal market, as envisaged by the Directive, would confli
with modern PIL principles concerning employee protection, as well as international tort
law.  ‘Modern’ PIL in relation to international tort law, serving the purpose of em
protection, was even presented as ‘classical’ PIL during the discussions, and it was 
recognized that the Directive would conflict with these PIL principles.98  
 
against ‘social dumping’ and ‘unfair competition’ – to be understood as including local 
employee protection – but a further analysis shows rather complicated tensions, 
interactions and assessment processes between different principles and concerns: the fight 
against national protectionism and unfair competition; internationally mobile employee 
protection and local employee protection, etc.99 
                                                 
97 O. De Schutter and S. Francq (footnote 35), p. 14: ‘Les régimes nationaux de protection des droits des 
travailleurs sont mis en concurrence les uns avec les autres de manière accentuée dans un système régi, 
sans exception, par le principe du pays d’origine, et où les Etats Membres cherchent à attirer les entreprise
afin qu’elles s’établissent sous leur jurisdiction », and they add in footnote no. 44: « L’on peut rappeler ici 
que, selon l’interprétation qu’en donne la Cour de justice, la liberté d’établissement des personnes morales 
leur permet de déterminer le lieu de leur établissement notamment en fonction du régime juridique qui sera 
applicable à leurs activités : ainsi, n’est pas constitutive d’
s 
abus la circonstance que la société n’a été créée 
., 
ights in the Union as a Learning Process’. And on the 
-
d 
g a 
dans un Etat Membre que dans le but de bénéficier d‘une législation plus avantageuse, et ce même si la 
société en cause exerce l’essentiel, voire l’ensembre de ses activités dans l’Etat d’établissement – C.J.C.E
30 September 2003, Inspire Art C-167/01 ». On the case law concerning Centros, Uberseering en Inspire 
Art, see also O. De Schutter, ‘Monitoring Human r
Directive on Services, see also  O. De Schutter. On the risk of social dumping in relation to article 119 EC
Treaty, see C. Barnard, “The Contribution of Anti-Discrimination Law to European Integration: the Adde
Value of the EU level”, under C. “The Defensive Use of Community Anti-Discrimination law” (includin
discussion on the Defrenne-case of the Court of Justice). 
98 See the Working document on the Proposal from the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection: (document 21.12.2004, DT\551156ENG.doc PE 353.297v01-00, p. 5): ‘(…) The country of 
origin principle conflicts with existing and much more specific instruments such as Rome I and the time-
honoured principles of international private law.’ 
99 See also in this context the discussions in PIL on the interpretation of the words “temporily employed” 
and “the country in which the employee habitually carries out his work” in Article 6 (2) (a) of the Rome 
Convention, sometimes explicitly taking into account this kind of considerations and concerns. See e.g. 
A.A.H. Van Hoek, “Het toepasselijk recht op arbeidsovereenkomsten – een reactie op het Groenboek 
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I.B.1.c. International tort law 
International tort law does not yet include any unified rules of applicable law at the 
European level. Acquis communautair does not apply to this domain, although it should 
be pointed out that, unification apart, various countries seem to have focused increasing 
attention on the victim’s position and the like.    
 
European rules of applicable law in the field of tort law are currently being prepared, in 
the form of a proposed regulation, the ‘Rome II Proposal’.100 As discussions about this 
Rome II Proposal show, there are sometimes tensions between ‘modern PIL’ on the one 
hand and European concerns about stimulating the internal market on the other hand – 
see, for example, the tensions between the proposed Article 3 of the Rome II Regulation 
and the country-of-origin principle. It turns out that there are also tensions between the 
original Proposal for a Directive on Services and modern PIL in respect of tort law, as 
was mentioned above.101 The discussions on ‘a Community public order’ held in the 
context of the Rome II Proposal are also worth mentioning!102 
 
But Article 6 of the Rome-II Proposal in particular, which  concerns ‘international 
defamation’, has given rise to much discussion. Article 6, which deals with ‘Violations of 
privacy and rights relating to the personality’, reads as follows: ‘1. The law applicable to 
a non-contractual obligation arising out of a violation of privacy or rights relating to the 
personality shall be the law of the forum where the application of the law designated by 
Article 3 would be contrary to the fundamental principles of the forum as regards 
freedom of expression and information.’ The discussions centred on considerations – 
some of which partly overlapping each other at times –  such as the freedom of the press,  
privacy protection, stimulation of the market through the introduction of the country-of-
origin principle in relation to ‘modern PIL’ (paying more attention to the victim’s 
expectations, the place where damage was sustained, etc.), difficulties in handling the 
                                                                                                                                                 
EVO”, Sociaal recht 2003, p. 365 ff, also published on www.europa.eu.int. See also the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice in cases such as Arblade (C-369/96 and C-376/96, Judgment of 23 November 1999;
Court of Justice stated in this judgment, among other things “1. Articles 59 of the EC Treaty (now, after 
amendment, Article 49 EC) and 60 of the EC Treaty (now Article 50 EC) do not preclude the imposition
a Member State on an undertaking established in another Member State, and temporarily carrying out w
in the first State, of an obligation to pay the workers deployed by it the minimum remuneration fixed by the 
collective labour agreement applicable in the first Member State, provided that the provisions in question 
 the 
 by 
ork 
are sufficiently precise and accessible that they do not render it impossible or excessively difficult in 
practice for such an employer to determine the obligations with which he is required to comply”; in 
consideration 34 it was argued “Even if there is no harmonization in the field, the freedom to provide 
services, as one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty, may be restricted only by rules justified by 
overriding requirements relating to the public interest and applicable to all persons and undertakings 
operating in the territory of the State where the service is provided, in so far as that interest is not 
safeguarded by the rules to which the provider of such a service is subject in the Member State where he is 
established (…)”, followed in consideration 36 by “The overriding reasons relating to the public interest 
which have been acknowledged by the Court include the protection of workers (…)”). See also in this 
context supra Part I, I.C.2.b.1., the Ingmar-case. 
100 Proposal for a European Regulation on rules of applicable law on international tort law, COM (2003) 
427 final, 22.7.2003. 
101 Cfr supra Part II, I.B.1.b. 
102 See supra Part II, I.B.1.b. 
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requirement that the publisher should comply with different laws, if the law of the 
residence of the victim or the law of the place where the damage was sustained would be
applied, fear that publishers would have to comply with foreign press laws in order to 
 
void civil liability, namely the constant threat of being sued under other foreign laws 
 
h 
3  
06104, international defamation 
ue from the scope of the 
roposed Regulation, paving the way for the adoption of the Regulation.’                  
a
and the negative impact this might cause, as this could prevent a newspaper published 
from extending their activities abroad, in relation to ‘internal market concerns’, in 
relation to the need to apply the country-of-origin principle and the fact that the publisher
will be more reluctant to publish in other countries if he can’t rely on ‘his own law’, in 
relation to the unpredictability of the necessity to comply with various tort laws, whic
would not be in line with the country-of-origin principle of the internal market, etc.10
 
In the Commission’s modified proposal of February 20
was finally left out of the scope of the Rome-II Proposal: ‘Taking into account the 
difficulties to articulate a inter-institutionally generally acceptable and balanced solution 
as regards the question of defamation by the media (Article 6 of the original proposal), 
the Commission decided to propose the exclusion of that iss
p
 
I.B.1.d. In conclusion: need to stick to PIL principles? 
Issues of international labour law and tort law often include discussions on the country
of-origin principle or ‘the home country rule’ as associated with the principle of ‘mutual 
recognition’. It has by now become clear that the introduction of this principle may give 
rise to fundamental questions105 and opposition106 in PIL.   
 
If one
-
 considers the country-of-origin principle as a PIL rule, then this may have far-
aching implications. It could entail the partial abandonment of modern PIL. It could 
                                                
re
 
103 For a description, see the « Summary and contributions of the consultation « Rome II » (commentary on 
the original draft proposal) – in the original draft proposal, the application of the law of the residence of the 
victim was proposed (art. 7); but newspaper and broadcasting industries stated that Art. 7 ‘does not strike a 
fair balance between the freedom of the press and the personal integrity of the victim of defamation. The 
fear was expressed that publishers would have to comply with foreign press laws in order to avoid civil 
liability), as well as the Explanatory Memorandum on the Rome II Proposal – here, it is argued ‘(…) the 
Commission has been sensitive to concerns expressed both in the press and by certain Member States 
regarding situations in which a court in Member State A might be obliged to give judgment against a 
publisher with its own nationality A under the laws of Member State B, or even a third country, even 
though the publication in dispute was perfectly in conformity with the rules applicable in Member State A. 
It has been pointed out that the application of law B could be unconstitutional in country A as violating the 
freedom of the press. Given that this is a sensitive issue, where the Member States’ constitutional rules 
diverge quite considerably, the Commission has felt that Article 6(1) should make it explicitly clear that the 
law designated by Article 3 must be disapplied in favour of the lex fori if it is incompatible with the public 
policy of the forum in relation to freedom of the press’. 
104 See supra, footnote 96. 
105 See, e.g., M. Fallon and J. Meeusen, ‘Private international law in the European Union and the exception 
of mutual recognition’, Yearbook of Private International Law 2002, vol. 4, pp. 37-66. 
106 See, e.g., M. Hellner, «The country of origin principle in the E-commerce Directive: a conflict with 
conflict of laws?’ in Les conflits de lois et le système juridique communautaire’, E. Pataut et al. (ed.). See 
also the reactions on the initial idea to introduce the country-of-origin-principle in the Directive on unfair 
commercial practices (Directive concerning Unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, OJ L 
149/22, 11 June 2005). 
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mean that principles such as the protection of the weak party in an international legal 
relationship would become less important. Consequently, the question arises whether th
introduction or proliferation of the country-of-origin principle could also jeopardise the 
protection of human rights. If this is the case, it might be argued that there is a strong 
need to stick with PIL rules and unify these rules in areas where this has not happen
yet.  
 
But in general, it turns out that ‘modern’ PIL in relation to international labo
international tort law may sometimes come under pressure and may even conflict with
current European incentives. And as modern PIL includes principles such as ‘protection 
of the weak party
e 
ed 
ur law and 
 
’, it turns out that European incentives conflict with such principles, and 
ith what is designated as ‘human rights protection’. Based on a first analysis, the 
odern PIL should be adhered to – contrary 
areas where PIL has already been unified in Europe and 
tives 
trary. 
w
provisional answer to the question whether m
to European incentives – could be, viewed from the perspective of human rights 
promotion, that in 
instrumentalised based on principles such as the protection of the weak party, a case 
should be made out for adhering to this result, notwithstanding new European incen
to the con
 
I.B.2. Case-study: international family law  
I.B.2.a. A first analysis: ‘modern’ PIL tends to concur with European incentives on PIL 
and human rights 
A first survey of the dynamics in respect of international family law, considered in it
relation to European develop
s  
ments and human rights, shows a somewhat different 
icture.  
tional 
ights 
ovement involves liberalisation of international family law,  in the 
nse of stimulating party autonomy, stimulating increased possibilities in the 
 
                                                
p
 
This sub-discipline of PIL has a long tradition of balancing the objectives of interna
harmony against other objectives, such as favouring divorce possibilities; modern PIL 
seems to be developing in the direction of increased party autonomy, recognition of r
contrary to provisions in the national law of the persons concerned, liberalisation of 
international family law.      
 
Developments concerning European interference in international family law essentially 
relate to the central principle of the free movement of EU citizens and their family 
members. Legislation enacted to date and recent jurisprudence by the Court of Justice 
interfering with the laws of Member States107 show that the ‘European tendency’ to 
promote this free m
se
international law of names, as well as stimulating divorce possibilities. Partly in order to  
avoid situations of international disharmony (avoiding ‘limping situations’), and to avoid 
‘loss of rights’ in the case of migration – concerns also inspired by the need to avoid
 
107 See, for example, the Brussels II bis Regulation as well as the decisions in Garcia Avello (C-148/02, 
Judgment dated 2 October 2003), and the Opinion in the Grunkin case (C-96/04, Opinion dated 30 June 
2005). European intervention sometimes turns out to go even further  than what is strictly required if one 
wants to promote human rights – see, for example, the manner in which the Brussels II bis Regulation 
incorporates the ‘favor divortii’ principle. 
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obstacles persons may encounter if they exercise their right of free movement – solu
are found that essentially result in more far-reaching liberalisation of international family 
law.  
 
In this context, modern tendencies in PIL seem to concur with Europea
tions 
n objectives, all in 
ll. And a first analysis reveals that human rights may definitely support this ‘combined’ 
stifies the conclusion that international family law is in special need of European 
e 
y, the objective of promoting the free movement of persons and the 
good 
l 
a
tendency towards the increased liberalisation of PIL. This means that the foregoing 
ju
incentives to support PIL, should there be a wish to promote human rights. Because at th
end of the da
objective of promoting human rights, such as family life protection, could be a very 
match, and liberal PIL rules fit in with this development very well.108  
 
Even so, it is appropriate to make two remarks about the above general observation.  
 
I.B.2.b. First remark: implications of the predominantly national nature of internationa
family law  
First, it should be borne in mind that much of international family law has not bee
unified in Europe yet. To be sure, there are supranational sources – conventions – that 
relate to international family law, which originate mainly from the Hague Conferenc
but even where these sources exist, they have been ratified only by a few countries. For 
this reason, PIL is still predominantly national. In several Member States, ‘favor 
tendencies’ may be distinguished in this national PIL – especially to be understood as 
tendencies to liberalise PIL – which could be indicated as ‘modern international family 
law’, but at various lev
n 
e; 
els. This is often connected with the ‘liberal’ nature of the 
bstantive divorce law: if, for example, the national substantive divorce law is rather 
l 
w. 
 
 
pean 
d in 
                                                
su
rigid, the international divorce law is often rather rigid as well – by contrast, in the 
Netherlands both the substantive and the international divorce law are extremely libera
nature. In other words, the tendency to liberalise international family law may be very 
manifestly present in a specific country, but, to a lesser degree, in some other European 
legal systems. This also explains why there is resistance against European developments 
in specific countries.  
 
Recently, Europe has taken unification initiatives in the field of international family la
A regulation such as Brussels II bis incorporates the principle of ‘favor divortii’ to an
important and far-reaching degree, and in the field of applicable divorce law, arguments
seem to be based on the favor divortii principle. From a broader perspective, Euro
PIL developments show liberalist tendencies, which causes resistance in specific Member 
States with less liberal PIL rules; arguments are being raised to put a stop to the 
increasingly far-reaching liberalisation tendencies. For example, Meeusen advocate
 
108 As far as the concurrence of European incentives with PIL and  human rights is concerned, see V. Van 
Den Eeckhout, ‘Communitarization of Private International Law: tendencies to ‘liberalise’ international 
family law’, tijdschrift@ipr.be (accessible through www.ipr.be) 2004, pp. 52-70 and V. Van Den Eeckhout, 
‘Communitarization of international family law’ (footnote 62), pp. 509-561, see also J. Meeusen, ‘The 
personal status of migrants’ (footnote 52) and  J. Meeusen, ‘System shopping in European Private 
International Law in Family Matters’ (footnote 52). 
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favour of setting a limit on unbridled developments in the direction of liberalism, fo
example, by introducing specific rules of applicable law or by accepting that, under 
specific circumstances, grounds for refusal are used at the stage of recognition of rules
drawn up abroad, and, in a more general sense, by advocating a restriction on the 
obligation to recognise rules adopted abroad to those situations where human rights are 
involved: ‘(…) human rights protection constitutes an inevitable limit to the Member 
States’ private international law. As the ECJ characterizes human rights as general 
principles of Community law, they are pertinent in all contexts of Community law, 
including those where private international law is at issue within the scope of application 
of Community law. Their intervention can reinforce mutual recognition, as Advocat
General Jacobs submitted in Grunkin-Paul, and so increase the pressure which EC law
puts upon private international law. In cases where no human rights are involved, which 
probably still is the case for the right to marry a person of the same sex, Member Sta
should accept that private international law rules can result in the non-recognition of a 
marital, or other personal, status obtained abroad without that this sho
r 
 
e 
 
tes 
uld necessarily be 
en as obstructing intra-Community freedom of movement in an unacceptable way’, 
y 
er 
 are  
t 
n 
ember 
tates? And, as an additional question: should intervention be confined to situations 
icular where human rights as such are 
 
                                                
se
says  Meeusen109.  Meeusen110 calls for ‘a better balance through harmonization of 
choice-of-law rules and a proper interpretation of public policy’. Meeusen argues that 
‘the Community legislator should search for a proper balance between the internal market 
requirements and the proper goals and values of private international law in famil
matters, instead of allowing the latter to be completely absorbed by system shopping and 
mutual recognition which do not suit in all respects its peculiarities.’ 
 
In this context, it is crucial to know the extent to which Europe may ‘push’ the Memb
States in the direction of more far-reaching liberalisation of their PIL. Of course, there
extensive discussions on the right to protect national cultural or moral values. A focus on 
the protection of these values could certainly slow down tendencies to liberalise 
international family law. This means that the key question is the following: to what exten
should the tendency to liberalise international family law, as pushed along by Europea
incentives and human rights principles, take account of resistance put up by M
S
where human rights are involved, or would it be desirable if Europe intervened in the 
direction of liberalisation in a broader sense, in part
not involved and where modern PIL should be based on principles such as favor 
matrimonii and favor divortii? In other words, should the favor tendency be limited to a
degree of liberalism enforced by human rights and should the remainder be left to the 
Member States, or should PIL evolve in the direction of favour even further?  
 
 
109 See, e.g., J. Meeusen, ‘The personal status of migrants at the interaction of human rights, private 
international law and European Union Law’ (footnote 52), and J. Meeusen, ‘System shopping in European 
Private International Law in Family Matters’ (footnote 52). 
110 See J. Meeusen, ‘System shopping in  European Private International Law in Family Matters’ (footnote 
52). 
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I.B.2.c. Second remark: Sometimes, the protection of human rights means that it may be 
better NOT to ‘go along with European concerns’  
It was argued above that one of Europe’s concerns is to avoid situations of international 
disharmony; after all, situations of international disharmony – also known as ‘limping 
relationship’ – may be an obstruction to persons who wish to move within the Union a
these are, 
nd 
in this sense, conducive to the internal market. It turns out that the human rights 
octrine may also help to achieve a situation of harmony, as it supports the recognition 
 a 
orced 
gnition of rights achieved abroad as a result of the 
pplication of  this law is enforceable in that Member State, this may give an impetus to 
 
national harmony, and may go some way towards preventing the  ‘loss’ of rights in 
d
obligation. Certainly where foreign law is more liberal than the law applicable in
specific Member State and if the possibility of invoking this foreign law can be enf
in that Member State – partly by relying on the doctrine of human rights – or if the 
possibility of arranging for the reco
a
the creation of ever more liberal PIL focussed on ‘favor’, which at the same time fosters
inter
the case of migration, and does not discourage people from moving freely within the 
Union.    
 
It should be recognised, however, that invoking the human rights doctrine may 
sometimes give rise to a situation of international disharmony, too. In at least two 
situations, which are briefly explained below, invoking the human rights doctrine could 
give rise to this kind of situation.  
 
I.B.2.c.1. If human rights are used as a ‘defence mechanism’, refusing to apply foreign 
law 
The first situation where invoking human rights may cause international disharmony i
where the application of human rights in a ‘liberalising’ way results in specific rights 
being granted to people who “normally” do not have these rights – for example, the 
situation where the national, normally appl
s 
icable law governing the person involved in 
e legal relationship fails to offer the possibility that is available if human rights are 
al 
he 
s 
or 
e 
ere 
A 
ber State A fails to apply foreign law, it is apparently unwilling, under these 
onditions, to create a legal relationship that would probably be recognised in the country 
th
invoked, and where this person’s country of origin will not be prepared to recognise the 
legal relationship created in this way. In spite of the prohibitory provisions in the nation
law of the relevant person, a legal relationship is created that will not be recognised in t
relevant person’s country of origin. In these situations, concerns for human rights in the 
sense that such invocation should guarantee a right – or, to put it more broadly, concern
for ‘favor’ principles – turn out to be in conflict rather than concur with concerns f
creating a situation of international harmony. If this human right is recognised, it may be  
very difficult for the person concerned to move to the country that refuses to recogniz
the legal relationship created in this way.  
 
It is also conceivable that foreign law that would normally be applicable in Member State 
A is more flexible than the national law of Member State A, and the application of that 
more flexible law would as such be more in line with ‘favor’ tendencies, but that th
are objections based on human rights considerations against the application of this law. 
classic example in this context is the concept of minor marriage. If, in this hypothesis, 
Mem
c
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where the legislation is in force. If, after their request has been rejected, the persons 
concerned subsequently create the desired legal relationship under foreign law, and if 
Member State A persists in its refusal to recognize this legal relationship, then there is 
situation of international disharmony. In this situation, it could be argued that the 
observance of ‘favor’ tendencies may prompt the application of foreign law, whereas t
observance of human right principles is incompatible with it.  Accordingly, in this 
hypothesis, the persons concerned are n
a 
he 
ot permitted to retain their ‘rights’ held in their 
ountry of origin in the case of migration, or if they submit their request in Member State 
t 
ll 
n 
 
ght to 
that  
ffects 
 
 the 
eedom 
s 
edom 
ouses are responsible for themselves.  
c
A.    
 
This and the earlier mentioned hypothesis (where foreign law is more rigid or more 
flexible, respectively, than the law applicable in a specific Member State) show the exten
to which the observance and a specific interpretation of human rights may sometimes 
concur and at other times conflict with concerns relating to international harmony as we
as with concerns relating to the preservation of rights in the case of migration; in this 
context, the ‘favor’ principle sometimes concurs but at other times conflicts with the  
argument of international harmony.111  
 
If one considers how PIL deals with such different situations, it is found that PIL 
sometimes accepts the potential lack of international harmony without any scruples. I
this context, the aforementioned decision of the German Constitutional Court112 dating
from the 1970s may be highlighted again: at the time, Spanish law prohibited marriages 
involving a divorced person; in Germany, however, a Spanish man, exercising the ri
enter into a marriage, was allowed to marry a German divorcee, in the knowledge 
the marriage would not be recognized in Spain. Initially, the German Federal Court had 
prohibited the solemnization of the marriage and had invoked the argument of protection 
of the woman (and the children born of a limping marriage) against the negative e
of a limping marriage. In this way, this court wanted to avoid the solemnization of a 
limping marriage at all costs, even against the will of the persons concerned, under the
banner of achieving a situation of international harmony. Later on, this decision was 
reversed by the German Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court dismissed
Federal Court’s reasoning as being paternalistic and invoked the argument of the fr
to marry as a fundamental right. The Court considered that it is the future spouses’ 
responsibility to take the risk of a limping legal relationship, while the competent 
authorities are only obligated to point out this risk to them and cannot protect the spouse
against their will. This would be incompatible with the fundamental right of the fre
to marry and with the idea that only the sp
                                                 
111 On the diffuse relationship between ‘favor’ principles on the one hand and principles relating to 
international harmony on the other, see also V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Internationaal privaatrecht en 
migratierecht. De evolutie van een tweesporenbeleid’ (footnote 52), and V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Review 
te 69), p. 300 ff, in particular footnote 1307 (with further references), footnote 1308 
P.M.M. Mostermans, Echtscheiding. Praktijkreeks IPR’, NIPR 2000, pp. 38-41. 
112 See supra Part I, III.B. See V. Van Den Eeckhout, Huwelijk en echtscheiding in het Belgische 
conflictenrecht (footno
and footnote 1314.  
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In this context, reference may also be made to Section 3 of the Marriages (Conflict of 
Laws) Act, as cited above113, which provides, for example, that a foreign prohibition 
against interreligious or interracial marriages does not apply in the Netherlands. 
Recently, the issue emerged in relation to PIL rules for same-sex marriages, in 
particular, in debates held on the desirability to anticipate the fact that a same-sex 
marriage will not be recognized in the national law of the relevant prospective spouse, 
in particular, by prohibiting this person from entering into such marriage. Even though
in same-sex marriages, it does not concern a human right, Dutch law permits such 
marriages subject to specific conditions. 
By now, PIL has gained some experiences with the type of situation described above. 
Now the question arises how this should be evaluated in the current European context, 
where it seems to be the ambition to have PIL function in a manner that does not hinder
the mobility of persons, and ease of mobility turns out to be very much connected with 
‘international harmony’. The question then arises whether in this day and age, one should   
ake account of the fact – to a greater extent than before – that a legal relationship created 
 
 
’ 
and prohibitions in its legal system? What is, in this context, the significance of the 
ination based on nationality applicable in EU law? Does it make 
        
t
in one Member State may not be recognized elsewhere. Or should the focus be on quite 
the opposite nowadays, on the obligation of that other Member State – in the case of the 
Spanish man who wanted to marry:  Spain – to recognize a legal relationship created  
abroad, despite the rules of national law, so that international harmony will be achieved 
in the long term? To what extent should the principle of nationality be adhered to as a 
connecting factor – can nationality be used as a connecting factor only in a ‘liberalising
sense, or also in the sense that restrictions and prohibitions as incorporated into a 
person’s national law may be heeded in a country that does not have these restrictions  
principle of non-discrim
any difference in this context, whether such issues concern human rights or not?114 etc.    
                                                 
113 See supra Part I, III.B. 
114 For a treatment of a number of these issues, in a period dating back to a time before the phenomeno
the Europeanisation of international family law (and with a strong focus on favor), see, for example, V. 
Van Den Eeckhout, Huwelijk en echtscheiding in het Belgische conflictenrecht (footnote 69). For a 
treatment of a number of these issues after the phenomenon the Europeanisation of international family law 
emerged, see V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Communitarization of Private International Law: tendencies to 
‘liberalise’ internationally family law’, 
n of 
tijdschrift@ipr.be 2004, pp. 52-70, especially p. 63. On the Garc
Avello case, see M. Bogdan, ‘The EC Treaty and the use of nationality and habitual residence, as 
connecting factors in international family law’, to be published in J. Meeusen, M. Pertegas, G. Straetmans, 
F. Swennen (eds.), International Family Law for the European Union, Antwerp: Intersentia 2006, in pr
(arguing that one could interpret the case as only offering the possibility to apply the national law if the 
person involved himself asks for this – without any obligation to apply the national law, e.g. in cases wher
the national law would be more restrictive: writing on the Garcia Avello case, Bogdan says: ‘It must be 
stressed that the judgment cannot be interpreted to require the application of the law of the country of 
citizenship against the will of the person concerned. In fact, it can be argued that Union citizens have the 
right to demand the application of the law of the Member State where they reside, in order to avoid being 
discriminated in comparison with local nationals’). In this way, Bogdan also talks about non-discriminatio
based on nationality, viewed  from the perspective of the mobile EU citizen who may be confronted in a 
specific Member State, where  nationality is used as a connecting factor, with a prohibition in that national 
law, which prohibition is not applicable in the Member State where the relevant person is resident to th
State’s own citizens, and where  this EU citizen raises the argument that he is confronted with nationality 
discrimination. See also several other contributions to this conference, presented at the JAI Conference, 
‘What international family law is ‘necess
ia 
ess 
e 
n 
is 
ary for the proper functioning of the internal market ?’ An inquiry 
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I.B.2.c.2. If human rights are used as a ‘defence mechanism’, refusing to recognize what 
has been created/recognized in another Member State  
r 
 although this could result in a situation of international disharmony, as one 
ountry fails to recognize legal relationships legally created in another country. Classic 
 
eated in a 
Sometimes human rights are applied as a defence mechanism in respect of the request fo
recognition of legal relationships created elsewhere: if these legal relationships were 
created in violation of principles of human rights, recognition could be refused on this 
ground,
c
examples in this context include the confrontation with minor marriages concluded 
abroad, repudiations abroad115, etc.  
 
The exercise of human rights in this way is especially but not exclusively116 known in a
situation where one Member State is confronted with a legal relationship cr
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nt of the contents of British family 
ver, 
to it 
st be borne in mind that these grounds for refusal are 
into the desirability of European private international law in family matters, with special regard to its 
legality, scope and implications in practice’, organized in Antwerp, Belgium, 21-22 October 2005, about 
problems and complications in applying ‘nationality’ as a connecting factor – e.g. to determine in some 
cases what is the ‘home country’, etc.    
115 See in this context recently the decision of the Belgian Constitutional Court of 4 May 2005, 
Rechtskundig Weekblad 2005-2006, p. 735, comments H. Storme. The Court was asked “1. “En ce qu
comporte une différence de traitement selon que le conjoint survivant d’une personne ayant travaillé en
Belgique est un homme ou une femme, l’article 24 & 2, de la Convention générale sur la sécurité sociale 
entre le Royaume de Belgique et le Royaume du Maroc, signée à Rabat le 24 juin 1968 et approuvée par la
loi du 20 juillet 1970, est-il conforme aux principes constitutionnels d’égalité et de non-discriminatio
consacrés par les article 11 et 11bis de la Constitution coordonnée (1994) ainsi qu’à l’article 14 de la 
Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales et qu’aux 
article 2, & 1er, et 26 du Pacte de l’O.N.U. sur les droits civils et politiques ? » 2. « En ce qu’il comporte 
une différence de traitement entre veuves d’une ressortissant belge et veuves d’un ressortissant marocain 
bigame, voire polygame, l’article 24, & 2, de la Convention générale sur la sécurité sociale entre le 
Royaume de Belgique et le Royaume du Maroc, signée à Rabat le 24 juin 1968 et approuvée par la lo
20 juillet 1970, est-il conforme aux principes constitutionnels d’égalité et de non-discrimination, consacrés 
par les articles 11 et 11bis de la Constitution coordonnée (1994) ainsi qu’à l’article 14 de la Conve
européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales et qu’aux articles 2, & 1er, et
26 du Pacte de l’O.N.U. sur les droits civils et politiques ? ». The Court argued that « (…) B.6. Il résulte de 
ceci que les differences de traitement dénoncées dans les questions préjudicielles découlent du droi
marocain sur lequel la Cour ne peut se prononcer. Les questions préjudicielles n’appellent pas de réponse ». 
(see also in this context ECRM 11 april 1996, appl. Nr. 24001/94, Gill & Malone (“Insofar as the 
applicants complain of the application of British family law in the present case, the Commission notes
the Dutch authorities, pursuant to the rules of Dutch international private law, applied British family law in
respect of the determination of the first applicants’ legal family ties with his natural daughter. The 
complaint against the United Kingdom could be understood as a complai
law insofar as it applied to the applicant’s family conditions. In this respect it is important to note, howe
that it was the Dutch authorities that took the relevant decisions regarding the recognition of the first 
applicant’s paternity and it was their responsibility, irrespective of the contents of British law, to see 
that the obligations under the Convention were respected. The responsibility of the United Kingdom under 
the Convention is therefore not directly engaged in this respect”).        
116 As far as the relationship between Member States are concerned, see also the grounds for refusal to 
recognise (inter alia on the basis of ‘violation of public order’) included in the Brussels II Regulation and 
the Brussels II bis Regulation – although it mu
particularly restricted (on this subject, see J. Meeusen, “System shopping”);  Cf. also,  in patrimonial cases, 
the  grounds for refusal as included in the Brussels Convention – now transformed into the Brussels 
Regulation. In this context, see also the Court of Justice’s decision in the Krombach case (Case C-7/98, 
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non-European legal system, which relationship may involve non-European citizens as 
ore 
well.    
 
This could also concern, for example, the situation where Member State A has already 
recognized the repudiation of two non-European citizens, possibly on the basis of a 
specific interpretation of human law principles, but where Member State B takes a m
strict position, also on the basis of a specific interpretation of human law principles117. 
Seen from a European perspective, two questions arise in this hypothesis.  
 
* Impact of the debates on the legal position of third country nationals   
First and foremost, questions involving the ‘jurisdiction’ of the European institutions to 
intervene in situations of this kind should be addressed; as far as this issue is concerned, 
up-to-date  studies carried out by European migration law experts relating to the legal 
position of non-EU citizens118 seem to be relevant to me. I am mainly interested in 
discussions about the question whether and to what extent arguments used in dealing wi
obstacles encountered by EU citizens wishing to exercise their right of free movem
can also be applied to the obstacles encountered by third country nationals using the 
th 
ent 
rights acquired by them under Community law, in particular in the area of mobility 
ating to 
e 
within Europe. It is also relevant to consider the question of who can rely on Article 12 of 
the EC Treaty (only EU citizens or also third country nationals?) and the question of the 
fields in which this Article 12 can be invoked, and the implications of such invocation. 
Considered in this PIL context, the question arises to what extent PIL rules rel
non-EU citizens fall under the European institutions’ power to carry out checks, wher
viewed from the perspective of the free movement of persons and the freedom of 
movement within Europe and/or ‘non-discrimination based on nationality’.119 What are, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Judgment dated 28 March 2000). In this context, I also refer to the debates on the concept of a ‘C
public order’ (supra, under Part II, I.B.1.c.).   
117 See in this context for some issues, raised in the frame of the Brussels Convention, ECJ 20 January 1994 
(Owens Bank), C-129/92, with conclusion A-G Lenz. In this case, the Court held that the rules of the 
Convention on recognition and enforcement do not apply to proceedings for an order for the enforcem
of judgments given in a non-Member State (It inferred that those relating to lis pendens and related action
are not available for the resolution of pr
ommunity 
ent 
s 
oblems encountered in the context of proceedings arising in parallel 
P. 
tionaliteit 
. 
nt’], 
nals, 
eusen, ‘De 
lijke 
in different Contracting States regarding recognition and enforcement of judgments delivered in a non-
Contracting State). See in this context also the principle “exequatur sur exequatur ne vaut”.   
118 See P. Boeles, ‘Burgerrechten van Europese burgers en derdelanders’ [‘Civil Rights of European 
Citizens and Third Country Nationals], in: Europees Burgerschap, Den Haag: TMC Asser Press 2003; 
Boeles, ‘Europese burgers en derdelanders: wat betekent het verbod van discriminatie naar na
sinds Amsterdam ?’ [‘European citizens and  third country nationals: what has been the meaning of  the   
prohibition against discrimination based on nationality since Amsterdam?’], SEW 2005, p. 500 ff and M.K
Bulterman and P.J. Slot, ‘Harmonisatie van wetgeving betreffende migrerende EU-burgers en 
derdelanders. Op weg naar een uniform toetsingskader’ [‘Harmonisation of Legislation concerning 
Migrating EU Citizens and Third Country Nationals. On the road to a uniform framework for assessme
SEW 2005, p. 348. Bulterman and Slot also propose assessing the legal position of third country natio
or certain aspect of that, from the perspective of ‘non-discrimination based on nationality’ or the non-
hindrance of free movement; even if this is not ‘immediately’ possible, the same dynamics should play a 
role, according to Bulterman and Slot. 
119 On the issue of the permissibility of nationality as a connecting factor in PIL, see also J. Me
europeanisering van het internationaal privaatrecht. Kanttekeningen bij recente institutioneelrechte
ontwikkelingen en bij de impact van het communautair verbod van nationaliteitsdiscriminatie’ [‘The 
Europanisation of Private International law. Comments on Recent Institutional Developments and the 
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above all, the implications of the outcome of these debates on the legal position of third 
country nationals for the checking power and for the method of assessment of the Court 
of Justice  in PIL matters involving non-EU citizens? To what extent can arguments and 
considerations in relation to non-discrimination based on nationality and freedom of 
movement within the Union be advanced that are also relevant to PIL matters involving 
third country nationals?  
 
It is clear that the PIL legislation that has been issued to date could certainly involve third 
country nationals as well. This is evident if one looks at the formal scope of application 
of the ‘Brussels II’ and ‘Brussels II bis regulations’. But the question relates to the  
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the arguments the Court of Justice were to 
embrace as far as third country nationals are concerned, more specifically, in relation to 
Articles 12, 17 and 18 of the EC Treaty.   
 
As far as the enactment of PIL legislation is concerned, there is another crucial question 
that needs to be addressed for the future and that may be relevant to both third country 
nationals and EU citizens: to what extent is it necessary and desirable to enact common 
legislation in the field of the (non-)recognisability of family-law relationships created 
outside the Union, but subsequently ‘imported’ into the Union, where it will possibly 
start to ‘circulate’?120 Where De Schutter121 says that Union interference is sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                 
ments, 
 it is 
reated in the same way 
tionality, with the result 
tems. That being likely to give rise to 
lity. The principle of non-
discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different 
situations must not be treated in the same way. 52.  All the parties having submitted written observations 
t is 
e 
is, 
 
y 
y 
nd 
indered from exercising rights, such as migration within the 
ote 52) and V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Communitarization of 
Impact of the Community Prohibition against Nationality Discrimination’] , in Migratie- en 
Migrantenrecht no. 10, Recente ontwikkelingen – Europa in het vreemdelingenrecht [Recent Develop
Europe in Aliens Law], Brugge: Die Keure 2004, pp. 248-290. As far as these aspects are concerned,
certainly worth considering the Grunkin Opinion (C-96/04) and the Garcia case (C-148-02). In Garcia 
Avello, nationality discrimination was the central theme. But what if third country nationals are involved? 
In the Opinion in  the Grunkin case, the focus was not on discrimination based on nationality, but free 
movement obstacles. See nos. 51 ff of the Opinion in the Grunkin case, which includes the following 
passage:  ‘51. In Garcia Avello, the Court noted in essence that Belgian practice t
ose with Belgian nationality alone and those with dual Belgian and Spanish nath
that the latter would have different surnames under the two legal sys
practical difficulties, there was discrimination on grounds of nationa
consider that there is no such discrimination in the present case. At the hearing, even Mr Grunkin did not 
appear to argue that there was discrimination on grounds of nationality. I agree that there is none. 53 I
clear from the relevant German legislation (15) that all those who have German nationality alone are 
treated in the same way, and that all those who have (or whose parents have) more than one nationality ar
treated differently but quite without discrimination as regards their nationality. 54.  Leonard Matthias 
however, from a practical point of view in a position closely comparable to that of the Garcia Avello 
children if in the Member State of his nationality a different surname must be registered from that which he
bears in the Member State of his birth. While the practical difficulties which he is likely to encounter ma
not stem from discrimination on grounds of nationality, they constitute a clear obstacle to his right as a 
citizen to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Although such difficulties ma
be of a similar kind to those encountered by Mr Konstantinidis, the combined effects of Articles 17 a
18(1) EC mean that it is now unnecessary to establish any economic link in order to demonstrate an 
infringement of the right to freedom of movement.’ What implications are we facing in similar case 
involving third country nationals who are h
Union, as a result of PIL complications?    
120 On this subject, see also V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Internationaal privaatrecht en migratierecht. De 
evolutie van een tweesporenbeleid’ (footn
International Family Law’ (footnote 62). 
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necessary to protect human rights, the question arises whether Union interference ma
also be necessary in matters involving the PIL assessment of family relationships create
outside the Union and then ‘imported’ direct into the Union,  or created outside the 
Union, then imported into the Union, where it turns out that these qualify or do not 
qualify for recognition in a specific Member State, after whic
y 
d 
h their status is submitted 
r assessment in another Member State. In such hypotheses, one may face various ways 
 observation immediately 
fo
of assessing aspects of human rights by the Member States. This
prompts the second type of question that may arise in this context. 
 
* Link with the problems advanced in the ‘Omega case’ 
As a matter of fact, a second type of question could be raised in connection with the 
hypothesis advanced above, in particular the question of the significance of the Omega
case in these situations
 
  
European freedoms is created.  
r European incentives!?
122, specifically in issues involving the freedom of Member States
to use their own ‘interpretation’ of human rights, even if this means that an obstacle to 
one of the four fundamental 
 
I.B.2.d. Conclusion: need of support fo  
  
free  
ovement of persons.         
All in all, quite complicated situations can arise in the context of international family law, 
and quite complicated issues can arise. But, returning to what I stated in the  
introduction123,  it seems legitimate to adopt the general attitude that if human rights are 
to be promoted in the domain of international family law, there is mainly a need for 
supporting European incentives – where European incentives are to be understood as
European interference with international family law as inspired by ‘European concerns’ 
relating to the stimulation of the internal market, in particular the stimulation of the 
m
 
II. Preliminary solution to this tension 
Seen from the perspective of promotion of human rights within the EU, the position to
taken in debates where there is tension between EU Law (EU Law-acquis and/or EU 
objectives) on the one hand, and the
 be 
 PIL (PIL-acquis and/or PIL objectives) on the other 
nd, is clear: preference should be given to the system (EU Law or PIL) which favours 
                                                                                                                                                
ha
the promotion of human rights the most; the “best solutions” should be exported, or 
imported from one system to the other. Above I haven’t worked out yet real “solutions”, 
but of course in further research some solutions could be – preliminary – explored. 
 
PART III. CONCLUSION   
Above I just attempted to position in a first, explorative and fragmentary way, the 
convergence or tension between ‘old’ (classical) and ‘new’ (European) tendencies to 
 
121 O. De Schutter, ‘Monitoring Human Rights in the Union as a Learning Process’. 
122 ECJ 14 October 2004, C-36/02. See also, e.g., M.K. Bulterman and H.R. Kranenborg, ‘What if rules on 
free movement and human rights result in conflicting obligations? About laser games and human dignity: 
the Omega Case’, European Law Review 2006, no. 1 volume 31, pp. 93-101 and T. Ackermann, Common 
Market Law Review 2005, pp. 1107-1120. See also O. De Schutter, ‘Monitoring Human rights in the Union 
as a Learning Process’ and O. De Schutter, ‘The implementation of the EU Charter’ (footnote 5), p. 8 ff, 
under ‘Human rights as exception to fundamental market freedoms.’ 
123 See supra Part II, I.B.2.a. 
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instrumentalise PIL and its interaction with human rights. But there is a need for a more
profound and broader analysis.      
  
In my opinion, it is sensib
 
le to deepen the analysis in the fields mentioned above – both  
ternational patrimonial law and international family law – and certainly to involve other 
 
bates, and how, from the perspective of human rights 
rotection, the PIL discipline may attempt to represent PIL either as an obstacle to the 
 of  
e 
onstitutional Court of 4 May 1971), and into the interaction between PIL and European 
 the 
catum 
sal for recognition in the  
russels Convention.  At this juncture, after the Europeanisation of PIL, debates are 
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fields in the analysis as well. In respect of other fields, too, attempts could be made to 
position the doctrine and significance of human rights in the area of tensions between 
European law and PIL. By pursuing this line of action, it could become easier, in my
opinion, to establish the position that had best be adopted from the perspective of human 
rights promotion in current PIL de
p
internal market or advance it as a tool that could be helpful in the process of European 
integration and the encouragement of the internal market, what lessons can be learned 
from PIL, and, in a  more general sense, what may be expected from PIL in the context of 
human rights promotion. 
 
And this brings me to my initial definition of the question, in particular the question
PIL as an exotic wallflower or a well-integrated participant in various companies and 
more specifically, the position that PIL may have for the purposes of this project. It 
seems to be worth the trouble to keep an eye on some of the points mentioned above and 
give further substance to these.   
 
If one examines such questions concerning PIL, human rights and European law, one 
finds oneself, as it were, ‘at the crossroads’ of various disciplines interacting with each 
other; in this context, attention should be paid both to ‘classical’ studies and to up-to-dat
studies concerning recent developments and dynamics, and the manner in which these 
interact with each other. Both studies into the interaction between human rights and 
European law – for recent publications on this issue, see the studies addressing the 
problems of the Omega case – and studies into the interaction between PIL and human 
rights (old discussions, for example those relevant in the above decision by the German 
C
law (‘classical’ and ‘new’ debates, before and after the Europeanisation of PIL) would 
ultimately have to be combined in an analysis of the interaction between PIL, European 
law and human rights. This type of analysis had been partly carried out even before
Europeanisation of PIL. For example, this could relate to analyses about the principle of 
non-discrimination based on nationality in the confrontation with the ‘cautio judi
solvi’, or  about the principle of ‘fair trial’ as a ground for refu
124B
being conducted about questions raised in the context of the Garcia-Avello125 and  
Grunkin cases126,  the legislation to be drafted in the field of international tort law, the 
impact of the country-of-origin principle, the concept of a ‘community public order’ etc. 
 
 
124 In this context, see, e.g., ECJ 28 March 2000, Case C-7/98 Krombach (see already above, footnote 116), 
and studies thereon.   
125 C-148/02, Judgment dated 2 October 2003. 
126 C-96/04. The Opinion dates from 30 June 2005. Judgment dated 27 April 2006. 
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All in all, from the perspective of this project, which is focused on the ambition to find 
ways of promoting human rights, the following crucial questions emerge: what role may 
PIL be expected to play if human rights are to be promoted? What position would 
wyers wanting to promote human rights have to take in PIL issues, and how should they 
take account of PIL issues? And what lessons can lawyers ‘learn’ from PIL as a 
discipline or the debates in PIL that may still be conducted?  
 
If one tries to answer such questions, one defies PIL, as it were, to emerge from the safe, 
snug cocoon in which the discipline has wrapped itself until now and enter a new phase. 
PIL will then have the opportunity to develop into a full-fledged and worthy participant 
in this project. Once the kind of questions raised above will be resolved, at the end of the 
REFGOV research, PIL will have become a full participant to the REFGOV project and 
become a full participant to the process of human rights protection and promotion within 
the EU.  
 
la
